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ABSTRACT 
Property law confronts circumstances where owners‘ excessive 
perceptions of their ownership rights impose social costs, frustrate policy 
goals, and hamper the very institutions meant to support private property. 
Groundbreaking research in cognitive framing suggests an answer to the 
question of how to selectively attenuate (or strengthen) ownership 
perceptions. In a novel application of this research, we contend that 
property law may ―set frames‖ for individual owners. Specifically, we 
hypothesize that framing property as bundles of rights and forewarning of 
limitations weakens perceptions of ownership and decreases resistance to 
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subsequent restrictions. We conducted experiments to evaluate these 
claims and found that both bundle-of-rights/discrete-asset framing and 
forewarning framing affect perceptions of ownership, rights infringement, 
valuation, and satisfaction. Our study shows that ―layering‖ both of these 
conditions (bundle framing and forewarning) have a stronger, synergistic 
impact than the sum of each effect alone. The potential applications of this 
research to property theory are numerous. Legislators, judges, and 
regulatory agencies craft legal measures that respond to, or even 
capitalize on, strong, preexisting frames of citizen-owners. These 
institutional players also endeavor to limit spillovers and other social 
harms by reframing property as a limited set of use rights in areas of law 
including pollution rights, intellectual property, and common interest 
communities.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A voluminous scholarly literature has extolled the virtues of private 
property and advocated laws to secure strong property rights.
1
 Yet, in 
certain contexts, intense preferences for strong, even unfettered, private 
property rights have created considerable havoc. At times, owners 
contemplate their property rights with a fierceness and inflexibility that 
clashes with the needs of modern society. Individuals have shot 
endangered species, chained themselves to foreclosed property, and built 
towering ―spite fences.‖ Conflicts arise when limitations do not square 
with owners‘ perceptions of their rights or of the nature of their property 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 52–78 (1985) (fifth amendment); Ilya Somin, Taking Property Rights Seriously? The 
Supreme Court and the ―Poor Relation‖ of Constitutional Law, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT: CONTESTED CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINES (Steven Kautz et al. eds., forthcoming 2009) 
(constitutional law); Thrainn Eggertsson, Open Access versus Common Property, in PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 73, 77 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 
2003) (property regimes); Annette M. Kim, A Market Without the ‗Right‘ Property Rights, 12 ECON. 
TRANSITION 275, 301 (2004) (economic development); Shem Migot-Adholla et al., Indigenous Land 
Rights Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Constraint on Productivity?, 5 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 
155, 156–61 (1991) (developing countries); Adam D. Moore, Owning Genetic Information and Gene 
Enhancement Techniques: Why Privacy and Property Rights May Undermine Social Control of the 
Human Genome, 14 BIOETHICS 97, 97–99 (2000) (property rights in one‘s body). 
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entitlement.
2
 Ownership perceptions may prompt extra-legal, or ―street 
level,‖ property behavior that extends beyond the formal scope of the 
property right and may create negative externalities.
3
 When that behavior 
is too costly to police it results in a de facto expansion of the scope of the 
individual‘s property rights; these property behaviors, if common enough, 
generalize to social norms.
4
 Legislatures in turn may respond by enacting 
laws that formalize owners‘ expectations5—in some instances contrary to 
broader social goals or allocative efficiency.
6
  
Groundbreaking psychology research in cognitive framing suggests an 
answer to the question of how to selectively weaken property perceptions. 
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have shown that the way in which a 
problem or choice is presented or ―framed‖ affects the decision maker‘s 
perceptions, and ultimately the decision maker‘s preferences.7 The framing 
of legal rights, specifically property rights, is novel ground in legal 
scholarship. Our basic insight is that the same property entitlement (or as 
near to the same as one can obtain without using identical language), 
presented two different ways, may produce sharply divergent outcomes. 
How a property entitlement is framed—that is, both the scenario in 
question and the applicable legal rule—will affect the attitudes and 
behaviors of societal actors subject to legal rules and influence policy 
makers as they choose among possible legal rules. In short, how we think 
 
 
 2. See generally JACQUELINE P. HAND & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, NEIGHBORING PROPERTY 
OWNERS (1988) (describing property conflicts and legal responses). 
 3. For an analog in the political science literature about how law on the ground is driven by the 
―street-level bureaucrats‖ such as state or municipal employees who implement it. See generally 
MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC 
SERVICES (1980). 
 4. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 10–
32 (1991). In many instances, social norms can be efficient within the context of a community or 
group of interdependent resource users. See id. at 50–57. However, social norms may also create 
negative externalities that are borne by individuals outside the community or weaker individuals 
within the community. 
 5. For discussion of the question of when and why law should vindicate people‘s expectations, 
see Bailey H. Kuklin, The Justification for Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
863 (2001).   
 6. Recent examples of this abound in the context of homeownership. Recent federal legislation 
has formally expanded homeowners‘ rights by offering foreclosure protection. See Housing and 
Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–289, § 257(e)(2)(B), 122 Stat. 2654 (to be codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 17157-23). At the state level, a spate of eminent domain laws have imposed limitations 
on residential takings or super-compensation requirements. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 32-24-4.5-8(2)(A) 
(2009) (compensation at 150% of fair market value for residential takings); Act of May 18, 2006, Kan. 
Chapt. 192, 2006 Kan. Sess. Laws 1345 (requiring legislature to consider compensation at 200% of 
appraised value); S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 13(B) (authorizing legislature to enact laws allowing eminent 
domain to remedy blight with the property put to public or private use). 
 7. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453–54 (1981). For discussion, see infra Part I.B.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/1
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about property matters. And because the way we think about property 
depends in part upon the presentation of rights information, how we write 
laws and create property entitlements matters too.  
The goal of this Article is to investigate how law can employ ―property 
frames‖ systematically to alter ownership perceptions and expectations 
regarding regulation. If there are no effects from framing, this suggests 
that the tremendous academic debate over the proper conception of 
property may have limited utility on the ground in affecting how people 
think about their property. If, as we hypothesize, framing property to 
convey a sense of limitation and cognitively prime restrictions weakens 
ownership perceptions, then property law may serve to ―set frames‖ in 
complex legal and social contexts. To clarify our analytical parameters, 
our aim is not to endorse a normative conception of weak property rights 
universally or to dispute the utility of private property. In many 
circumstances, strong property rights perceptions (and even 
misperceptions) promote individually and socially valuable investment. 
Rather, we contend that in certain contexts excessively strong rights 
expectations impose steep social costs in the various currencies of 
efficiency, fairness, and social responsibility—and may stymie the very 
property institutions they purport to extend.  
The potential applications of our research to property and 
environmental law are numerous. Statutory law, regulations, case law, and 
even legal theory can all reframe property rights. Legislators, judges, and 
regulatory agencies frame (and reframe over time) rights in pollution, 
intellectual property, land use, concurrent and common ownership, and 
inheritance to name a few. In some cases, these institutional players craft 
legal measures that respond to (or even capitalize on) strong, preexisting 
frames of citizen-owners.
8
 In other cases, they endeavor to limit spillovers 
and other social harms by reframing property rights as a limited set of use 
rights, rather than unfettered dominion.  
Too often, the subject of attitudes and perceptions has been cast aside 
in legal scholarship in favor of entirely hypothetical models of behavior or 
ex post markers such as economic gains or losses, votes, or other external 
behaviors.
9
 This Article seeks to intervene at an earlier point in the 
 
 
 8. For example, jurisdictions have enacted strong protections against trespass, with some states 
such as Texas explicitly authorizing the use of force to prevent or terminate trespass. See TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 9.41 (Vernon 2003).  
 9. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9–109 (2004) 
(describing law and economics approach to property law including conflict and cooperation in the use 
of property). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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process—before the decision has been made, the money spent, the vote 
cast. Is this psychological manipulation, a legal sleight of hand? Perhaps. 
We argue that in some contexts the social ends justify the means. In 
certain cases, greater gains may avail from the strategic presentation or 
framing of the initial property right than from our current menu of choice: 
ex post regulation, incentives, government intervention, and litigation. In 
addition, attitudes and perceptions not only affect the behavior of 
individual property owners, but determine the political viability and 
ultimate fate of laws. In many instances, framing motivates politicians, 
who act as attitude entrepreneurs, gleaning the sentiments of constituents 
in some instances, attempting to reshape those sentiments in others.
10
  
We investigate two ways of framing property: first, bundle-of-rights 
versus discrete-asset framing, and second, forewarning framing. There is a 
long-standing debate in the scholarly literature about the appropriate 
conception of two paradigms—the ―discrete-asset‖ paradigm and the 
―bundle-of-rights‖ paradigm—used at various times and by various groups 
to represent the notion of property rights.
11
 Under the discrete-asset 
approach, the owner of a piece of property has dominion, subject to some 
constraints, over that asset.
12
 Under the bundle approach, property can be 
viewed as a bundle of sticks: each stick represents a right to occupy, use, 
sell, exclude others from, or deploy property in some way.
13
 Many 
theorists who have employed the bundle-of-rights conception emphasize 
its instrumental orientation: rights follow from social goals and policies.
14
 
 
 
 10. See Donald R. Kinder, Opinion and Action in the Realm of Politics, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 778, 778–87 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
 11. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Packaging Property: The Effect of Paradigmatic 
Framing of Property Rights, 83 TUL. L. REV. 691, 694–707 (2009).  
 12. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, at v 
(2007) (conceptualizing property rights as the ―right to exclude others from [a] discrete thing‖); J. E. 
PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 2–3, 82–83 (1997) (criticizing the bundle of rights as 
amorphous as to both particular rights embodied in bundle and quantum of rights that constitute 
property ownership); 1 F. A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 107 
(1973) (defining property ownership as the right to determine uses); Eric R. Claeys, Property 101: Is 
Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 617 (2009) (reviewing MERRILL & SMITH, 
supra) (also conceptualizing property as an owner‘s interest in determining the use of the thing she 
owns).  
 13. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 31–32, 58 (1913) (proposing theory of property rights and 
correlative obligations); A. M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A. G. 
Guest ed., 1961) (describing ―incidents of ownership‖); BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 20–28 (1977) (property law extends different rights in an object to multiple 
resource users).  
 14. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES, at xxxix–
xl (4th ed. 2006) (discussing the role of the bundle of property rights in structuring social relations); 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/1
  
 
 
 
 
2010] PROPERTY FRAMES 455 
 
 
 
 
Systematically framing property as a bundle of rights may weaken 
ownership perceptions because individual strands of rights evoke a sense 
of limitations; if owners associate dominion with owned objects, moving 
from object language to rights language may reduce expectations of 
unlimited control. In addition, the description of a complex of rights, 
rather than the more simplistic ownership of an object, may increase 
cognitive demand and encourage information-driven rather than emotional 
responses. In addition to bundle versus discrete asset frames, we consider 
whether framing through forewarning affects subsequent rights 
restrictions. We test whether forewarning—meaning ex ante limitations 
and restrictions explicitly communicated to the rights holder—affects 
perceptions of ownership, valuation, and regulatory action. We 
hypothesize that this form of framing primes, or increases the cognitive 
accessibility of, information on rights restriction and tempers expectations 
for subsequent property use.  
To date, the legal scholarship has largely neglected the potential for 
property frames to alter ownership perceptions and reactions to subsequent 
rights infringement. The rational choice model does not account for the 
powerful effects of framing on decision making.
15
 The legal scholarship on 
property paradigms (i.e., bundles versus discrete assets) focuses 
exclusively on normative models of property and treats behavior with 
respect to property as exogenous to the choice of property paradigm. The 
exception is the legal realists‘ use of the bundle of rights to depict property 
as limited, flexible rights capable of ceding to social needs and 
obligations. Legal realism‘s deployment of the bundle paradigm may be 
recast through a psychological lens as cognitive re-framing, at least with 
respect to the realists‘ intended audience of sophisticated legal actors.16 
The legal realism scholarship fails, however, to examine the impact of the 
bundle paradigm on owners‘ perceptions and to seek empirical evidence of 
the framing capability of bundles of rights. This Article seeks to fill that 
empirical void in the property scholarship. 
 
 
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
745 (2009) (property entitlements entitle not only rights but social obligations). 
 15. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 3–14 (1976) 
(discussing the spread of rational choice theory from economics to the social sciences).  
 16. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and 
Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 365 (2001) (―[T]he motivation behind the realists‘ fascination with 
the bundle-of-rights conception was mainly political. They sought to undermine the notion that 
property is a natural right, and thereby smooth the way for activist state intervention in regulating and 
redistributing property.‖).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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To accomplish this, we created an experimental deception where 
incoming first-year law students learned that the law school was 
considering a change in the school laptop computer policy. We presented 
the proposed laptop purchase policy to students randomly assigned to one 
of four ―framing‖ conditions: the bundle-of-rights form, the discrete-asset 
form, the bundle-of-rights form with forewarning of property rights 
limitations, and the discrete-asset form with forewarning of property rights 
limitations. The experiment assessed the effect of bundle-of- 
rights/discrete-asset framing and forewarning framing on perceptions of 
ownership, likelihood of installing upgrades, satisfaction, perceptions of 
property rights infringement from subsequent restrictions, behavioral 
intentions with respect to compliance, and affective responses. A second 
experiment instructed students that the law school was considering a 
laptop buying pool and asked each student to provide willingness to pay 
amounts for each of four descriptions (discrete asset with forewarning, 
bundle of rights with forewarning, discrete asset, and bundle of rights) of 
the same laptop.  
Our findings provide evidence that framing similar information in 
different ways systematically alters perceptions, attitudes, and reactions. 
We found that framing alone—with no other substantive legal 
intervention—changes expectations regarding the strength of property 
rights and reactions to subsequent regulation. Framing also affects 
satisfaction, valuation, and compliance intentions. Most significantly, our 
study shows that ―layering‖ both of these conditions, bundle framing and 
forewarning framing, has a stronger, synergistic impact than the sum of 
each of these effects alone.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the problem of 
excessive property perceptions. We then review the framing research in 
cognitive psychology and examine the bundle of rights/discrete asset 
dichotomy in legal theory. We contend that discrete-asset and bundle 
paradigms may serve as framing devices that attenuate property 
perceptions and decision making. In Part II, we discuss the two 
experiments we conducted and report the statistical analyses and results. 
Part III examines the relevance and import of our findings for property 
theory. Our findings challenge fundamental conceptions of property law, 
including assumptions about the endogeneity of property perceptions and 
the futility of liberating laypeople from the discrete-asset or dominion 
paradigm of ownership. In Part IV, we suggest areas where reframing 
might appropriately be used to realign owners‘ understandings of their 
property rights. We focus primarily on areas of law where bundle-of-rights 
framing can attenuate or refine rights perceptions. However, our research 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/1
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is equally applicable to contexts that call for strengthening property 
perceptions; we demonstrate the effectiveness of discrete-asset framing for 
that purpose. In this Part, we consider regulatory framing of conservation 
measures and market-based pollution trading permits. We also examine 
the legal and quasi-legal framing of rights in common interest 
communities and copyrighted intellectual property.  
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS PARADIGMS AS COGNITIVE FRAMES 
One of the puzzles of property law has been how to limit perceptions of 
property dominion when these perceptions prompt externalities and 
impose social costs. The scholarly debate on property paradigms has fallen 
short of its potential to impact property law in this respect.
17
 The legal 
literature construes the governing property paradigm as a matter of some 
theoretical abstraction or, at best, as a conceptual guide for expert decision 
makers. We contend that the property paradigms—or, in our view, 
property frames—can be employed not just to specify the appropriate 
conception of rights but to systematically alter the attitudes, expectations, 
and behavioral intentions of property owners. In this Part, we consider the 
problem of excessive ownership perceptions. We then review the 
empirical literature on cognitive framing and examine the long-standing 
legal divide over two paradigms of property ownership—bundle of rights 
versus discrete assets—in view of framing research.  
A. When Property Attitudes Are Too Strong 
Property law is peppered with instances where owners perceive their 
rights in stronger and more expansive terms than their legal entitlement or 
societal needs dictate. Property owners have chained themselves to their 
buildings after defaulting on mortgages.
18
 Neighbors routinely use their 
property in ways that contravene the rights of others. One case describes 
an owner who built a thirty-foot concrete wall within feet of his neighbor‘s 
window (with the neighbor retaliating by posting signs in his yard 
identifying the owner and describing him in colorful language).
19
 This is 
not to claim that owners are invariably absolutist in their conception of 
ownership but rather to observe that in discrete contexts unduly robust and 
 
 
 17. See infra Part I.C.  
 18. See Steve Rode, Woman Chains Self to Home to Prevent Foreclosure, http://getoutofdebt. 
org/2533/woman-chains-self-to-home-to-prevent-foreclosure/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2010).  
 19. See When Your Neighbor Builds a Jackass Home, http://www.mikeindustries.com/blog/ 
(July 20, 2008). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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expansive notions of property rights impose social costs and frustrate 
efficiency goals. For example, neighbors‘ actions may decrease area home 
values.
20
 Lobbying for special protections for property, such as enhanced 
creditor protection for homeowners, increases the cost of credit while 
reducing its availability.
21
 Conflict and self-help create noneconomic costs 
by impairing social and neighborhood relations.  
Examples of excessive ownership attitudes also occur in the 
environmental arena. Some landowners believe that their rights in private 
land justify violations of the Endangered Species Act—a practice termed 
―shoot, shovel, and shut up.‖22 The destruction of species on private land 
creates externalities in the form of ecosystem harms (which may impair 
monetarily valuable ecosystem services), diminution of genetic diversity, 
and loss of societal value from viewing species or knowing they exist.
23
   
In instances where property attitudes prove costly, law has struggled to 
alter perceptions and change behavior. One way to reduce ―ultra vires‖ 
property behaviors—that is, actions outside the scope of the legal 
entitlement—is by conveying a sense of limitation that owners internalize. 
Such internalization also addresses instances where behavior is socially 
desirable but not formally required by law. For example, it is not possible 
for laws to offer complete specification addressing every eventuality.
24
 In 
these cases an individual sense of restraint or a prevailing social norm can 
 
 
 20. Cf. Vicki Been, What‘s Fairness Got to Do with It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of 
Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1020–21 & nn.109–12 (1993) (describing 
evidence of effect of locally undesirable land uses on neighboring property values as ―quite mixed,‖ 
but noting several studies supporting that point).  
 21. See Reint Gropp et al., Personal Bankruptcy and Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q. J. 
ECON. 217, 230–31 (1997); see also Richard M. Hynes, Credit Markets, Exemptions, and Households 
with Nothing to Exempt, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 493, 512–15 (2006). 
 22. See Joyce Morrison, Shoot, Shovel and Shut-up, NEWSWITHVIEWS.COM, Aug. 14, 2004, 
http://www.newswithviews.com/Morrison/joyce7.htm; see also Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading 
Species: A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9–11 (2007) 
(discussing undesirable incentives to which the Endangered Species Act gives rise). A study of 
landowner actions toward the Preble‘s meadow jumping mouse, a threatened species under the 
Endangered Species Act, found that 25% of landowners destroyed habitat or took other actions that 
discouraged mouse populations on their land. See Amara Brook et al., Landowners‘ Responses to an 
Endangered Species Act Listing and Implications for Encouraging Conservation, 17 CONSERVATION 
BIOLOGY 1638, 1641–49 (2003).  
 23. See Stephanie Stern, Encouraging Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral Analysis of 
Financial Incentives, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 541, 545–46 (2006). 
 24. For example, building codes and zoning have not been able to prevent the ingenuity of 
builders and owners from circumventing these laws. See, e.g., Michael D. Turner, Paradigms, 
Pigeonholes, and Precedent: Reflections on Regulatory Control of Residential Construction, 23 
WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 27, 52–55 (2001).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/1
  
 
 
 
 
2010] PROPERTY FRAMES 459 
 
 
 
 
fill the gaps.
25
 Framing offers a way to constrain individual behavior, 
increase legal compliance, and encourage pro-social norms of ownership.  
B. Cognitive Framing Research 
The psychology research demonstrates the effect of framing in decision 
making and, most important for our purposes, suggests the potential of 
framing to alter perceptions and behavior with respect to property.
26
 
Rational choice theory predicts that societal actors will seek to maximize 
individual utility on the basis of stable preferences when presented with a 
choice, including one created by a legal rule or regime.
27
 Recent 
scholarship has highlighted the limits of the rational choice approach.
28
 
Among other things, the rational choice model does not account for the 
powerful effects of framing on preferences and decision making. The 
research of Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky has shown that, while 
people may approach a setting with a preconceived or natural frame, the 
presentation or framing of a choice alters the decision maker‘s 
preferences.
29
  
Because presentation frames increase the cognitive accessibility of 
certain problem attributes, they influence attitudes, emotions, and 
decisions.
30
 In a seminal framing study, the ―Asian Disease‖ experiment, 
Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated that people respond differently to 
scenarios in which mortality rates are presented as lives saved as opposed 
 
 
 25. See generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990). 
 26. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7. 
 27. See supra note 15. 
 28. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Theory and the Hypothesis of Rationality, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE: UTILITY AND PROBABILITY 25, 25–31 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1990); HERBERT A. 
SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED RATIONALITY 20–75 (1982). 
 29. Decision frame refers to the internal mental representation of a problem. See generally 
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7.  
 Even in the absence of a choice of presentation, a person‘s default or ―natural frame‖ may 
predominate. See Nash, supra note 11, at 708 (noting how the traditional metanarrative of property 
understands the discrete asset paradigm as the ―natural frame‖ through which to view property rights); 
Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Property ‗Instinct,‘ 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS: BIOLOGICAL SCIS. 1763, 1767 
(2004) (noting biologists‘ observations of members of species reacting to perceived infringements of 
property interests of other members of the species); Jonathan Remy Nash, Framing Effects and 
Regulatory Choice, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 313, 356–58 (2006) (describing the ―natural frames‖ 
through which environmental regulatory devices tend to be viewed).  
 30. See Daniel Kahneman, A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded 
Rationality, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 697, 703 (2003) (―Highly accessible features influence decisions, 
whereas features of low accessibility are largely ignored. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe 
that the most accessible features are also the most relevant to a good decision.‖).  
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to lives lost, even though the bottom line effects are identical.
31
 People 
evaluate gains and losses relative to a cognitive frame or reference point.
32
 
We tend to be risk-seeking, often irrationally so, when it comes to 
avoiding high-probability losses but risk-averse in the face of high-
probability threats to money or other property we view as a gain. For 
example, given the choice between a certain loss of $100 versus a 50% 
chance of either no loss or a $200 loss, people are likely to choose the 
risky choice rather than the certain loss, even though the average expected 
value of the two choices is identical.
33
 This pattern reverses with respect to 
gains where people show a marked tendency to prefer a certain gain for 
example of $100 versus a 50% chance of winning $200. Researchers have 
found that the activation of emotions plays a mediating role in framing 
effects.
34
    
While psychology methodologies require invariance (i.e., the identical 
information or expected utility presented two different ways), political 
scientists and communications researchers construe frames more 
expansively as persuasive presentation.
35
 This research investigates how 
framing by the media and political elites alters attitudes toward public 
policies and political events.
36
 As Donald Kinder and Thomas Nelson 
write, ―public opinion depends in a systematic and intelligible way on 
how, and especially whether, issues are framed in democratic debate.‖37 
Framing effects are also evident in product advertising and consumer 
purchasing decisions. For example, research shows that framing consumer 
 
 
 31. See Kahneman, supra note 30, at 702. 
 32. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263–65 (1979). 
 33. See id. 
 34. See Benedetto De Martino et al., Frames, Biases, and Rational Decision-Making in the 
Human Brain, 313 SCI. 684, 684 (2006). 
 35. For example, a frame in communication or media ―refers to the words, images, phrases, and 
presentation styles that a speaker . . . uses when relaying information about an issue or event to an 
audience . . . .‖ Dennis Chong & James N. Druckman, A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in 
Competitive Elite Environments, 57 J. COMM. 99, 100 (2007). They distinguish between frames and 
framing effects: ―A framing effect occurs when a communication increases the weight of a new or 
existing belief in the formation of one‘s overall attitude . . . . [F]rames in communication exercise 
influence by emphasizing the primacy of certain considerations over others.‖ Id. at 107. 
 36. The common sources of framing describe the dual role of frames as ―rhetorical weapons [of] 
political elites . . . or . . . journalist[s]‖ and ―cognitive structures that help citizens make sense of 
politics.‖ Donald R. Kinder & Thomas E. Nelson, Democratic Debate and Real Opinions, in FRAMING 
AMERICAN POLITICS 103, 103 (Karen Callaghan & Frauke Schnell eds., 2005); see also Fuyuan Shen 
& Heidi Hatfield Edwards, Economic Individualism, Humanitarianism, and Welfare Reform: A Value-
Based Account of Framing Effects, 55 J. COMM. 795, 803–04 (2005). This study also found that 
individual differences with respect to ex ante value orientations amplified or muted framing effects. 
See id. 
 37. Kinder & Nelson, supra note 36, at 103 (emphasis omitted). 
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goods with symbolic appeals versus emphasizing instrumental product 
attributes produces systematic differences in willingness to pay 
measures.
38
  
Taking a broad view of framing, we may also regard forewarning 
people of future events or restrictions as a type of framing. Forewarning is 
a powerful cognitive tool for tempering expectations. Researchers have 
studied forewarning most intensively in the context of reducing persuasion 
by forewarning of the persuasive intent of communications.
39
 Forewarning 
―primes‖ specific attitudes and increases the cognitive accessibility of 
certain information. Even indirect priming may alter attitudes. For 
example, a recent experiment found that subjects who received a cup of 
iced coffee from a laboratory assistant later rated a hypothetical person 
described in written material as colder, less social, and more selfish than 
subjects who received a hot coffee.
40
 
The cognitive framing of property rights is novel ground in both the 
legal scholarship and psychology literature. Psychology research has made 
only one significant foray into the field of property, with a substantial 
body of research on the endowment effect.
41
 These studies find that people 
value property more highly when they own or possess it than when they 
are presented with the possibility of buying the same item in a voluntary 
market transaction.
42
 Thus far, the psychology research has confined its 
inquiry to valuation and has not considered whether framing ownership or 
ex ante legal entitlements influences perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral 
intentions. In the legal literature, scholars have studied framing almost 
exclusively in the contexts of litigation and settlement, finding that 
subjects are more likely to settle a case out of court when the frame of 
 
 
 38. See Donald P. Green & Irene V. Blair, Framing and the Price Elasticity of Private and 
Public Goods, 4 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 1, 1–4 (1995) (framing goods with symbolic appeals 
produces higher variance and weaker price elasticity in willingness to pay). 
 39. This research establishes the forewarning of persuasive intent reduces subsequent persuasion 
by inducing counter-arguing. See Richard E. Petty & John T. Cacioppo, Effects of Forwarning of 
Persuasive Intent and Involvement on Cognitive Responses and Persuasion, 5 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 173, 173 (1979). 
 40. See Lawrence E. Williams & John A. Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes 
Interpersonal Warmth, 322 SCI. 606, 606–07 (2008). 
 41. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1484 (1998); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, 
Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1541–49 (1998) (demonstrating, 
through empirical research, that the endowment effect is more applicable to rights protected by an 
injunctive remedy than by a damages remedy); but see Charles R. Plott & Kathryn Zeiler, The 
Willingness to Pay—Willingness to Accept Gap, the ―Endowment Effect,‖ Subject Misconceptions, 
and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 530, 530–34 (2005) 
(questioning experimental evidence of the endowment effect).  
 42. See sources cited supra note 41.  
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reference makes the same settlement offer appear to be a gain rather than a 
loss.
43
 This Article seeks to augment the existing scholarship by 
empirically testing the effects of framing property rights.   
C. Property Paradigms: Bundles versus Discrete Assets 
Property theory (unwittingly) suggests two potential mechanisms for 
framing. Scholars have long recognized the prevalence of two 
―paradigms‖ of property rights: the ―discrete-asset‖ paradigm and the 
―bundle-of-rights‖ paradigm. Under the discrete-asset approach, each item 
of property is viewed as a discrete asset—that is, the owner of a piece of 
property is understood to have dominion, subject to some constraints, over 
that asset.
44
 The discrete asset paradigm emphasizes the ―thing‖ aspect of 
property. Under the bundle approach, property consists merely of a bundle 
of sticks, each representing a right to occupy, use, sell, exclude others 
from, or deploy property in some way.
45
 One who has an interest in a 
property asset in fact has a bundle of rights and correlative obligations, 
and a less than complete set of sticks in the bundle does not negate 
ownership.
46
 These rights and obligations govern not only the person‘s 
relation to the asset in question, but also the person‘s relations with other 
societal actors.
47
 Implicit in this conception is the province of a legal 
 
 
 43. See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An 
Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 134–35 (1994); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, 
Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 144–49 (1996) (similar findings 
using a variety of litigation simulations).  
 For exceptions to the focus on litigation and settlement in framing, see Nash, supra note 11 
(exploring framing based on asset- and bundle-paradigmatic presentations of property rights); Janice 
Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed 
Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 713 (2008) (exploring 
how framing affects acceptance of government takings of property based on use to which government 
puts property and former owner‘s attachment to property). For a collection of legal and psychological 
scholars‘ treatments of property and psychology, see Symposium: A Psychological Perspective on 
Property Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 601 (2009). 
 44. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *1–3; PENNER, supra note 12, at 70–73; J. W. 
HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 120 (1996). 
 45. Honoré described eleven incidents of the liberal conception of full property ownership: the 
rights to possess, use, manage, the rights to income from the property and the right to capital, the right 
to security, transmissibility, the incident of absence of term, the duty not to harm others, liability to 
execution, and residuary character. See Honoré, supra note 13, at 113–28; see also 1 JOHN LEWIS, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES 52 (3d ed. 1909) (―Property may 
be defined as certain rights in things which pertain to persons and which are created and sanctioned by 
law. These rights are the right of user, the right of exclusion and the right of disposition.‖). 
 46. Hohfeld is credited with the earliest formulation of the ―bundle of rights.‖ See Hohfeld, supra 
note 13, at 710 (describing rights, including property rights, as ―correlative claims and duties‖ between 
societal actors with respect to an object).  
 47. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
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―expert,‖ such as a legislature or court, to determine the content of the 
bundle of rights.
48
  
The bundle-of-rights conception now dominates property law and legal 
training.
49
 Over the course of the last century, legal scholars came to view 
the discrete-asset paradigm as inconsistent with legal understandings of 
property rights.
50
 They systematically abandoned the previously dominant 
discrete-asset approach in favor of the bundle approach.
51
 Legal realists 
and social relations theorists in particular have employed the bundle 
concept in pursuit of normative ends, such as correcting power imbalances 
between social actors.
52
 The bundle of rights lends itself to such pursuits 
because of its fluidity of form: the particular contents of the bundle, as 
well as the minimum constituents that create ―property,‖ may vary with 
societal goals.
53
 Even law and economics has for the most part adopted the 
bundle view.
54
 Other scholars have proffered theories that encompass, but 
are not limited to, the bundle of rights paradigm. These pluralist accounts 
construe property as bundles of rights versus discrete assets depending on 
social context and expectations.
55
  
 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 831 (1935) (describing a ―functional method‖ of rights definition according to 
social ends); LEWIS, supra note 45, at 53 (―The right of user is limited by those regulations which are 
enacted for the general good . . . .‖). 
 48. ―[T]he bundle of rights theory transformed property into an almost infinitely malleable 
concept, amendable to numerous permutations, and subject to ad hoc decisionmaking.‖ Abraham Bell 
& Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 545–56 (2005); see also 
ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 11. 
 49. Bruce Ackerman describes the bundle of rights as a ―consensus view so pervasive that even 
the dimmest law student can be counted upon to parrot the ritual phrases on command.‖ ACKERMAN, 
supra note 13, at 26. For a description of the history of the bundle versus discrete asset debate in the 
legal scholarship, see Claeys, supra note 12. 
 50. See Nash, supra note 11, at 696.  
 51. See, e.g., J.E. Penner, The ―Bundle of Rights‖ Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 
712–14 & n.1 (1996); Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 357–58; Denise R. Johnson, Reflections on 
the Bundle of Rights, 32 VT. L. REV. 247, 250–55 (2007).  
 52. Cf. Jane B. Baron, The Contested Commitments of Property, 61 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 
2010) (arguing that an important, yet overlooked, aspect of the debate over how to conceive of 
property rights is the question of how readily property rights should change in response to changes in 
society‘s value commitments). 
 53. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 12, at 16 (―The [bundle of rights] metaphor implies that 
one can add to or subtract from the bundle more or less without limit, and still talk about the bundle as 
property.‖).  
 54. Some economics scholarship espouses a discrete asset focused approach in order to reduce 
transaction costs. For example, Friedrich Hayek notes that defined expectations reduce ―the mutual 
interference of people‘s actions with each other‘s intentions‖ and that property ―demarcate[s] for every 
individual a range of permitted actions by designating . . . ranges of objects over which only particular 
individuals are allowed to dispose and from the control of which all others are excluded.‖ HAYEK, 
supra note 12, at 107. 
 55. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 17 (1990) (―It is perfectly sound to think 
of property both as things (the popular conception) and as relations among persons or other entities 
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Despite this historical shift to the bundle approach among those with 
legal training, there is a sense that the public-at-large generally adheres to 
the discrete-asset approach.
56
 J.E. Penner observes that the ―average 
citizen, free of the entanglements of legal philosophy, thinks [property] is 
. . . the right to a thing.‖57 Legal training strives to advance students from 
the layperson‘s object-focused notion of ownership to a purportedly more 
sophisticated bundle approach—―to disabuse entering law students of their 
primitive lay notions regarding ownership.‖58 Yet, despite this 
acculturation, lawyers and judges frequently revert to the discrete-asset 
paradigm.
59
 For example, Bruce Ackerman details how Takings Clause 
jurisprudence predominantly analyzes property rights under the lay 
conception, rather than the bundle-of-rights conception, of property.
60
  
Today the legal academy and legal community remain uneasily wedded 
to the bundle approach.
61
 In recent years, some legal scholars have 
suggested reintegrating the discrete-asset approach into property theory.
62
 
For example, Michael Heller argues that property theoreticians‘ narrow 
focus on the bundle paradigm has caused them to ignore problems inherent 
in the disaggregation and fragmentation of property rights.
63
 Other 
 
 
with respect to things (the sophisticated conception)—provided that the context makes clear which 
conception is meant.‖); see also Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1598–605 (2008).  
 56. For example, Bruce Ackerman observes, ―I think it fair to say that one of the main points of 
the first-year Property course is to disabuse entering law students of their primitive lay notions 
regarding ownership.‖ ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 26.  
 57. See PENNER, supra note 12, at 2. But see LEWIS, supra note 45, at 55 (―The dullest individual 
among the people knows and understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights. . . . They 
constantly act upon this understanding, although they may never have formulated a definition of the 
word . . . .‖). 
 58. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 26. 
 59. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1188–
91 (1999) (presenting, skeptically, the traditional account).  
 60. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 113–67. Thomas Merrill makes a similar argument in 
analyzing the Court‘s decision in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); see Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 939 (2000). On the general 
topic of the role of public perception in Takings jurisprudence, see William W. Fisher III, The 
Significance of Public Perceptions of the Takings Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1774 (1988).  
 61. An aspect of the debate over bundles of rights versus ―things‖ or discrete assets focuses on 
whether the right to exclude defines property. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to 
Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (describing right to exclude as ―sine qua non‖ of property). 
Cf. PENNER, supra note 12, at 103 (property should be defined as a ―right of exclusive use‖). Other 
scholars have criticized the focus on exclusion and offered alternative theories. See, e.g., Larissa Katz, 
Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 278 (2008) (defining property as 
agenda-setting authority).  
 62. Not all of these criticisms are recent. For earlier criticism of the bundle approach, see 
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69, 81 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
 63. See Heller, supra note 59, at 1193–94.  
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scholars critique the law and economics literature on property for its 
failure to recognize the importance of property law as governing in rem 
rights to things.
64
 Most recently, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith argue 
that an in rem, thing-based conception of property provides economic 
explanations for several puzzles of property law, including why property 
law systems across nations and cultures generally limit the number of 
available forms of property rights.
65
 This work indicates a renaissance of 
interest in the discrete-asset paradigm or ―in rem‖ conception of property.  
The debate over the proper conception of property—bundle versus 
discrete asset—has now extended over a century with no resolution in 
sight. We contend that this debate has missed a critical dimension: the 
potential of property paradigms to alter lay attitudes and influence political 
elites. Although the legal literature acknowledges the bundle-asset 
dichotomy as a conceptual matter, it pays little heed to the important 
context of whether the governing paradigm affects behavior. Much of the 
commentary treats behavior in respect to property as exogenous to the 
choice of property paradigm (i.e., bundle of rights versus discrete asset).
66
 
In this sense, the dominant literature adheres to the rational choice model, 
and fails to consider how the choice of paradigm might affect the frame 
through which people conceive of property rights.  
This study seeks to fill a void in property theory by considering how 
framing affects perceptions of the strength and scope of property rights. 
We consider two framing conditions: the bundle versus discrete-asset 
paradigms and a frame created from a forewarning of limitations. We 
examine the effect of framing on: (i) the strength of ownership and the 
extent to which people perceive regulation as an infringement of their 
property rights, (ii) the value that people attribute to their property, and 
(iii) the nature of people‘s emotional responses to property rights 
limitations. It is to a discussion of these experiments that we turn in the 
next Part. 
 
 
 64. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 366–83; see also Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and 
Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 360–70 (2009) (describing how the realists 
used their conception of patents to reconceptualize property in land, and suggesting that this enterprise 
was deleterious for both property in land and for patent law). 
 65. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 16, at 385–88; see generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. 
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE 
L.J. 1 (2000). Other scholars have criticized the bundle approach and proposed alternatives. See, e.g., 
J. W. Harris, Reason or Mumbo Jumbo: The Common Law‘s Approach to Property, 117 PROC. BRIT. 
ACAD. 445, 466–67 (2002). 
 66. See supra notes 44–65 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE EXPERIMENTS 
A. Methods 
1. Experiment 1 
a. Study Design and Hypotheses 
This experiment was a two-by-two factorial design with four framing 
conditions. The first hypothesis was that bundle-of-rights framing would 
create weaker perceptions of ownership and less perceived infringement of 
rights from subsequent restrictions (accompanied by greater behavioral 
intention to comply voluntarily and less negative emotion). We also 
predicted that the ownership-attenuation effect of bundle framing would 
decrease valuation of the property, satisfaction with the purchase policy, 
and willingness to install upgrades. We hypothesized the same main 
effects for forewarning framing. For the condition that contained both 
bundle-of-rights and forewarning framing, we hypothesized that the results 
would run in the same direction but would be stronger than either 
bundle/asset or forewarning framing standing alone (i.e., an interaction 
effect).  
b. Participants and Materials 
Participants were 397 incoming first-year law students, comprised of 
155 students from Loyola University Chicago School of Law and 242 
from Tulane Law School who participated voluntarily in this experiment 
during an orientation prior to the start of classes.
67
  
c. Procedure 
In an experimental deception, incoming students were informed at the 
start of law school orientation that the law school was considering 
adopting new student laptop computer policies. They were asked to review 
the proposed policies and to provide feedback on a form that was included 
in the registration materials.
68
 Students were randomly assigned to four 
 
 
 67. Male students account for 49.5% (n = 120) of the respondents while female students 
constituted 39.5% (n = 96). Students self-reported as Caucasian (77.4%, n = 188), African-
American/black (5.8%, n = 14), Hispanic/Latino (5.3%, n = 13), Asian American (4.1%, n = 10), 
Native American/Alaskan (0.4%, n = 1), and multi-racial (2.1%, n = 5). 
 68. In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, students received instructions that participation was 
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experimental conditions: discrete asset with forewarning (group 1), bundle 
of rights with forewarning (group 2), discrete asset no forewarning (group 
3), and bundle of rights no forewarning (group 4). Students in the discrete 
asset conditions (group 1 and group 3) read a proposed policy requiring 
each J.D. student to purchase a laptop computer from the campus 
computer store and stating that the student would ―have ownership and 
control of the laptop and, among other things, [could] use, possess, and 
enjoy the laptop, exclude others from using the laptop, and transfer the 
laptop.‖ The students in the bundle of rights conditions (group 2 and group 
4) received a proposed policy requiring students to purchase rights to a 
laptop computer from the campus computer store and stating that once 
purchased students would ―own a set of rights to the laptop. These rights 
include, among other things, the right to use, possess, and enjoy the laptop, 
the right to exclude others from using the laptop, and the right to transfer 
your rights in the laptop.‖ The entitlement was functionally similar in 
terms of the scope of ownership in the two conditions; the difference was 
the use of rights language versus ownership of a thing. In both discrete 
asset and forewarning conditions, the policies clarified that the students 
would own, not rent the computers, by stating that the laptop/rights in the 
laptop would be the student‘s to keep.  
In the forewarning conditions, (group 1 and group 2) the laptop policies 
went on to state that the student‘s ownership ―may be limited in certain 
ways by the law school.‖ Specifically, those purchase policies informed 
students that the laptop would be specially configured for law students, 
used in accordance with law school regulations and the honor code policy, 
and otherwise limited by the law school rules or needs of other computer 
users.  
The first part of the experiment contained two manipulation check 
questions to assess whether participants understood the nature of the 
property rights and the presence or absence of limitations described in the 
proposed laptop purchase requirement.
69
 Next, students were asked to state 
what they would be willing to pay for the laptop described in the proposed 
laptop purchase requirement and to rate their willingness to invest in 
 
 
voluntary, confidential, and anonymous, and that they could choose not to complete the survey at any 
time without penalty.  
 69. These survey questions asked: (1) According to the proposed laptop purchase requirement, 
what will you own? (Answer options: I will own the laptop; I will own a set of rights to the laptop; 
Neither) (2) Does the proposed laptop purchase requirement include limitations on your laptop rights 
imposed by the law school? (Answer options: There are no limitations on laptop rights imposed by the 
law school in the laptop purchase policy; There are multiple limitations on laptop rights imposed by 
the law school in the laptop purchase policy.). 
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software upgrades on a five-point Likert item ranging from ―very likely‖ 
to ―very unlikely.‖70 The remainder of Part I consisted of a five-point 
Likert item assessing the degree of satisfaction with the proposed laptop 
purchase requirement and a three-question Perceptions of Ownership 
Scale. The Perception of Ownership Scale, developed for this study, 
evidences strong reliability (Cronbach‘s alpha = 0.77).71  
The second part of the experiment examined the effects of bundle and 
forewarning framing on reactions to subsequent restrictions. The study 
instructed participants to assume that the law school had adopted the 
proposed laptop purchase policy previously described (i.e., one of the four 
experimental conditions). The laptop purchase requirement was 
reproduced at this point in the survey. Participants were then told that the 
law school had decided to adopt policies that affect laptop use and 
ownership.
72
 The three policies contained restrictions on the classic 
property rights to use, exclude, and transfer. These proposed policies 
restricted the right to upload large files and software without prior 
permission, required students to share their laptops/rights in the laptop 
from time to time with students in the LL.M. program (with password 
protection), and required permission from the dean of students to sell or 
transfer the laptop/rights in the laptop during law school. 
Following each restrictive policy scenario, students responded to 
questions that assessed perceptions of rights infringement, willingness to 
comply in the absence of enforcement, and emotion (anger, anxiety, and 
positive mood).
73
 The Perceptions of Rights Infringement Scale, 
 
 
 70. ―Likert scales are psychometric scales commonly used in questionnaires and survey research. 
Respondents specify their level of agreement to a given statement when responding to questionnaire 
items.‖ Leah M. Christensen, Enhancing Law School Success: A Study of Goal Orientations, Academic 
Achievement, and the Declining Self-Efficacy of Our Law Students, 33 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 57, 65 
n.57 (2009).  
 71. The questions composing the Perceptions of Ownership scale asked participants to indicate 
their level of agreement with the statements: ―If the law school were to adopt this laptop purchase 
requirement, I would feel that the laptop does not belong to me‖; ―If the law school were to adopt this 
laptop purchase requirement, I would feel uncertain about whether or not the laptop is my property‖; 
and to report perceived strength of ownership in response to the question, ―If the law school were to 
adopt this laptop purchase requirement, to what extent would you feel that you own the laptop?‖  
 72. The survey instructed participants that the laptop purchase requirement applies to all three 
policies and that they should consider each policy separately, not cumulatively. The order of the three 
policies was counterbalanced among the participants.  
 73. The survey used the five-adjective anger-hostility subscale and the five-adjective tension-
anxiety subscale of the Profile of Mood States-Brief Form (POMS-B). Numerous studies have 
established the high content validity and reliability of the POMS-B with a Cronbach‘s alpha > 0.9 
(excellent range) measured on a value index from 0 to 1. See, e.g., D.M. McNair et al., MANUAL FOR 
THE PROFILE OF MOOD STATES. New York: Multi-Health Systems; Eun Ja Yeun & Kay KongBum 
Shin-Park, Verification of the Profile of Mood States-Brief: Cross-Cultural Analysis, 62 J. CLINICAL 
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developed by one of the authors and utilized in the questionnaire, showed 
strong reliability across all three policy scenarios (perceptions of rights 
infringement: Cronbach‘s alpha = 0.74 (file saving), 0.79 (laptop sharing), 
and 0.84 (laptop transfer).
74
 Immediately following completion, students 
received a written debriefing explaining that the survey was an experiment 
assessing perceptions of property rights and that the law school was not 
considering new laptop policies.  
2. Experiment 2 
a. Study Design and Hypothesis 
This was a within-subjects experiment design where subjects were 
asked their willingness to pay (WTP) for a laptop under all four purchase 
policy frames (discrete asset with forewarning, bundle of rights with 
forewarning, discrete asset no forewarning, and bundle of rights no 
forewarning). The hypotheses were that subjects would show the lowest 
WTP for the bundle of rights with forewarning description, the highest 
WTP for the discrete asset no forewarning description, and intermediate 
WTPs for the discrete asset with forewarning and bundle of rights no 
forewarning conditions.  
b. Participants 
Participants were fifty-seven incoming first-year evening law students 
at Loyola University Chicago School of Law who voluntarily participated 
in the study as part of their law school orientation prior to the start of 
classes.  
c. Procedure 
At the start of orientation, students were informed that the law school 
was considering adopting one of four laptop purchase policies and forming 
a ―buying pool‖ to negotiate a better price for students. The experimental 
 
 
PSYCHOL. 1173, 1176–77 (2006). To balance the negative adjectives employed in the POMS-B, this 
question also included a positive mood scale developed by the authors that utilized the adjectives of 
―empowered,‖ ―pleased,‖ ―happy,‖ and ―respected‖ (Cronbach‘s alpha: 0.81 (file saving), 0.81 (laptop 
sharing), and 0.86 (laptop transfer)).  
 74. Perceptions of infringement of rights was assessed by asking participants to indicate their 
degree of agreement or disagreement with the following statements: ―How fair or unfair is the 
policy?‖; ―When I think about [the policy], I think my rights of ownership have been limited‖; and ―I 
think that the law school has a right [to implement the policy].‖  
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materials reproduced an online advertisement from an internet computer 
store for a laptop computer. The advertisement provided the sales price 
and detailed laptop specifications. Each student was asked how much he 
or she would be willing to pay for the laptop described in the 
advertisement under each of four purchase policies, with the policy 
ordering counterbalanced among the participants. The four purchase 
policies were identical to those used in Experiment 1 (discrete asset with 
forewarning, bundle of rights with forewarning, discrete asset no 
forewarning, and bundle of rights no forewarning). Immediately following 
completion of the experiment, students received a written debriefing 
explaining that the survey was an experiment assessing perceptions of 
property rights and that the law school was not adopting a laptop purchase 
policy or forming a buying pool.  
B. Results and Discussion of Findings 
The results show that two framing devices seem to reduce people‘s 
expectations about the strength of their property rights.
75
 First, the use of 
the bundle paradigm to frame property rights attenuates ownership 
perceptions and reactions to subsequent rights restriction. Second, the 
presence of forewarning about the possibility of future limitations on 
property ownership and use has a similar effect. Moreover, we observe the 
combination of these two—that is, reliance upon the bundle paradigm and 
the inclusion of forewarning—to most effectively reduce people‘s 
expectations about property rights. We found no significant differences in 
the results based on race, gender, income, or school affiliation.
76
 
 
 
 75. We used analysis of variance of independent one-tailed planned orthogonal contrasts to test 
whether the data conformed to the predicted pattern of sample means among the four subject groups. 
Subjects who did not correctly answer both manipulation check questions were excluded from the 
sample and analysis. The effect sizes are reported using the Pearson correlation coefficient.  
 76. Demographic factors did not have a statistically significant effect on the results (comparison 
of sample means: school affiliation: all ts < 1.63, all 2-tailed ps > 0.10; gender: all ts < 1.74, all 2-tailed 
ps > 0.08; race: all fs < 2.34, all 2-tailed ps > 0.074; and income: all fs(dfbg5, dfwg 201) < 1.11, all 2-
tailed ps > 0.35). The only exceptions were that African-American students scored lower than Hispanic 
students on positive mood under the laptop transfer restriction (f (4, 217) = 2.67, 2-tailed p < 0.033) 
and Tulane students scored slightly lower than Loyola students for positive mood in response to file 
saving restrictions, t(226) = 2.15, 2-tailed p < 0.032, r2 = 0.02. The effect of not currently owning a 
laptop or never having owned a laptop could not be analyzed because virtually the entire sample 
owned laptops; only seven students had never owned a laptop and only one student did not currently 
own a laptop but had previously owned one.  
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1. Experiment 1 
a. Perceptions of Ownership 
The bundle-of-rights frame (group 2 and group 4) markedly reduced 
the subjects‘ perceptions of the strength of their ownership entitlement as 
well as ownership-related attitudes and intentions. Subjects in the bundle-
of-rights condition had significantly lower scores on the perception of 
ownership scale than subjects exposed to the discrete asset frame, t(238) = 
11.74, one-tailed p < 0.0001, r
2
 = 0.36 (see Fig. 1). This was a large effect. 
Subjects who received the laptop purchase policy framed as a bundle of 
rights also reported lower valuations of the laptop when asked how much 
they would be willing to pay for it than when the laptop purchase was 
framed as a discrete asset, t(228) = 5.74, one-tailed p < 0.0001, r
2
 = 0.12 
(see Fig. 2). There was not a statistically significant difference between the 
bundle-of-rights groups and the discrete-asset groups on their reported 
likelihood of installing upgrades, t(238) = 1.58, one-tailed p < 0.06, or 
satisfaction with the policy, t(237) = 1.41, one-tailed p < 0.09 (see Figs. 3, 
4).  
The forewarning framing condition (group 1 and group 3) showed a 
similar pattern of results, suggesting that forewarning also constrains the 
―dominion‖ approach to property. There was a statistically significant 
difference in perceptions of ownership between the forewarning and no 
forewarning groups, t(238) = 6.64, one-tailed p < 0.0001, r
2
 = 0.15 (see 
Fig. 1). Forewarned individuals perceived themselves to have weaker 
rights in the laptop than their non-forewarned counterparts. As predicted, 
forewarning groups were willing to pay less money for the laptop 
described in the purchase policy than no forewarning groups, t(228) = 
2.92, one-tailed p < 0.002, r
2
 = 0.04 (see Fig. 2). There was a small but 
statistically significant effect of forewarning on likelihood of installing 
upgrades and satisfaction with the laptop purchase policy. Groups who 
were forewarned of property rights limitations reported less willingness to 
pay for upgrades, t(238) = 2.47, one-tailed p < 0.007, r
2
 = 0.02, and less 
satisfaction, t(237) = 2.80, one-tailed p < 0.003, r
2
 = 0.03 (see Figs. 3, 4).  
When the frame consisted of both the bundle paradigm and 
forewarning (group 2 interaction condition), the statistics reveal three key 
findings. First, subjects under this frame had the weakest perceptions of 
laptop ownership, t(238) = 15.27, one-tailed p < 0.0001, r
2
 = 0.49 (see Fig. 
1). In contrast, subjects who were presented with the discrete-asset frame 
with no forewarning perceived themselves to hold the strongest property 
rights of the four subject groups (see Fig. 1). Second, in keeping with this 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
472 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:449 
 
 
 
 
ownership-attenuation effect, the bundle of rights/forewarning subjects 
displayed the lowest willingness to pay for the laptop. The bundle of 
rights/no forewarning and discrete asset/forewarning groups stated higher 
valuation than the bundle of rights/forewarning group but lower valuation 
than the discrete asset/no forewarning group, t(228) = 7.13, one-tailed p 
< 0.0001, r
2
 = 0.18 (see Fig. 2). The bundle of rights plus forewarning 
group also reported the lowest likelihood of installing upgrades, t(238) = 
3.35, one-tailed p < 0.0005, r
2
 = 0.04, and the least satisfaction with the 
laptop purchase policy, t(237) = 3.49, one-tailed p < 0.0005, r
2
 = 0.05 (see 
Figs. 3, 4). Last, as discussed next in Part II.B.1.b, the bundle of rights 
combined with forewarning produced the least perceived rights 
infringement from restrictive regulation. 
FIGURE 1: PERCEPTIONS OF OWNERSHIP 
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FIGURE 2: WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
 
FIGURE 3: LIKELIHOOD OF INSTALLING UPGRADES 
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FIGURE 4: SATISFACTION WITH LAPTOP PURCHASE POLICY 
b. Reactions to Regulation 
As predicted, the bundle-of-rights condition weakened reactions to 
limitations on property rights. This effect was statistically significant for all 
three restrictive policies: file saving t(229) = 2.75, one-tailed p < 0.003, r
2
 
= 0.03; laptop sharing t(236) = 4.22, one-tailed p < 0.0001, r
2
 = 0.07; and 
laptop transfer t(233) = 3.62, p < 0.0001, r
2
 = 0.05 (see Fig. 5). There was 
also a small but statistically significant effect for refusal to comply for 
laptop sharing but no significant effects for file saving or laptop transfer: 
file saving t(233) = 1.21, one-tailed p < 0.114, r
2
 < 0.01; laptop sharing 
t(237) = 2.63, one-tailed p < 0.0043, r
2
 = 0.01; and laptop transfer t(233) = 
1.54, p < 0.063, r
2
 < 0.01 (see Fig. 6).  
Forewarning of future restrictions also reduced perceptions of rights 
infringement following regulation. This effect was statistically significant 
for the three restrictive policies affecting laptop transfer, t(233) = 1.74, 
one-tailed p < 0.042, r
2
 = 0.01; laptop sharing t(236) = 2.05, one-tailed p 
< 0.021, r
2
 = 0.02; and file-saving t(229) = 2.87, one-tailed p < 0.0025, r
2
 
= 0.03 (see Fig. 5). There was a small, statistically significant effect for 
refusal to comply with subjects who were forewarned of limitations 
reporting greater willingness to comply: file saving t(233) = 2.45, one-
tailed p < 0.0072, r
2
 = 0.01; laptop sharing t(237) = 1.72, one-tailed p 
< 0.043, r
2
 < 0.01; and laptop transfer t(233) = 2.25, p < 0.013, r
2
 = 0.01. 
This is reflected in Figure 6.  
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When the bundle-of-rights form and forewarning were layered together 
(group 2 interaction conditions) participants reported the lowest perceived 
rights infringement. Participants exposed to this dual frame were most 
likely to accept what those in other conditions saw as interference with 
their property rights. Conversely, subjects in the discrete asset, no 
forewarning group showed the greatest perceived infringement. This 
finding held true across all three policy scenarios: laptop sharing t(236) = 
5.20, one-tailed p < 0.0001, r
2
 = 0.10; file saving t(229) = 4.58, one-tailed 
p < 0.0001, r
2 
= 0.08; and laptop transfer t(233) = 4.42, one-tailed p < 
0.0001, r
2 
= 0.08 (see Fig. 3). There was also a statistically significant, 
although small, effect for willingness to comply (see Fig. 4). Subjects who 
received forewarning and bundle framing expressed the greatest 
behavioral intention to comply with the proposed regulations: file saving 
t(233) = 3.01, one-tailed p < 0.0014, r
2
 = 0.01; laptop sharing t(237) = 
3.61, one-tailed p < 0.0002, r
2
 = 0.01; and laptop transfer t(233) = 3.12, 
one-tailed p < 0.0009, r
2
 = 0.01 (see Fig. 6).  
 
FIGURE 5: PERCEPTIONS OF INFRINGEMENT BY POLICY SCENARIO 
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FIGURE 6: LIKELIHOOD OF COMPLYING BY POLICY SCENARIO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Emotional Response  
Our findings with respect to subjects‘ emotional reactions were not 
uniformly significant and, even when significant, were typically of small 
magnitude. In the bundle condition, there was a significant difference in 
the predicted direction of less anger and hostility only in the laptop 
transfer restriction. (file saving t(221) = 1.01, one-tailed p < 0.16, r
2
 < 
0.01; laptop sharing t(228) = 1.09, one-tailed p < 0.14, r
2
 < 0.01; and 
laptop transfer t(223) = 1.68, p < 0.048, r
2
 = 0.01). In the forewarning 
condition, the anger/hostility measure was significant only for laptop 
sharing (file saving t(221) = 1.33, one-tailed p < 0.10, r
2
 < 0.01; laptop 
sharing t(228) = 1.85, one-tailed p < 0.034, r
2
 < 0.01; and laptop transfer 
t(223) = 0.58, one-tailed p < 0.28, r
2
 < 0.01). The tension/anxiety measure 
generated no statistically significant results for bundle/discrete asset 
framing or forewarning/no forewarning framing for any of the three 
scenarios.
77
  
When both bundle-of-rights and forewarning framing were present 
(group 2 interaction condition), there was a significant decrease in 
anger/hostility relative to the other three conditions. The anger/hostility 
 
 
 77. In the bundle framing conditions, the anger/hostility measure was significant only for laptop 
transfer: Tension/anxiety results for bundle framing: file saving t(221) = 0.40, one-tailed p < 0.35, r2 < 
0.01; laptop sharing t(226) = 1.25, one-tailed p < 0.11, r2 < 0.01; and laptop transfer t(226) = 0.63, 
one-tailed p < 0.27, r2 < 0.01. Tension/anxiety results for forewarning: file saving t(221) = 0.82, one-
tailed p < 0.21, r2 < 0.01; laptop sharing t(226) = 1.17, one-tailed p < 0.13, r2 < 0.01; and laptop 
transfer t(226) = 0.53, one-tailed p < 0.30, r2 < 0.01.  
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effect was statistically significant across all three policy scenarios: file 
saving t(221) = 1.92, one-tailed p < 0.028, r
2
 < .01; laptop sharing t(228) = 
2.42, one-tailed p < 0.008, r
2
 = 0.01; and laptop transfer t(223) = 1.87, 
one-tailed p < 0.032, r
2
 < 0.01. However, the results provide only limited 
support for the tension/anxiety interaction hypothesis (i.e., both bundle 
and forewarning framing). Only the laptop sharing scenario showed 
significant results: file saving t(221) = 1.00, one-tailed p < 0.17, r
2
 < 0.01; 
laptop sharing t(226) = 1.99, one-tailed p < 0.025, r
2 
= 0.01; and laptop 
transfer t(226) = 0.95, one-tailed p < 0.18, r
2
 < 0.01.
78
  
Why might some of the emotional measures not generate statistically 
significant effects? There are several possible explanations. Perhaps the 
most likely is that the various scenarios were understood by participants 
either as uncertain to affect them or hypothetical, and therefore did not 
elicit strong emotional responses. Another explanation is that while some 
of the emotional adjectives offered by the POMS-B mood scale were 
potentially salient to participants‘ responses, others (such as, for example, 
―shaky‖ and ―grouchy‖) simply did not capture the feelings elicited by the 
scenarios. It is also possible that frames affect people‘s cognition of 
property rights, but do not evoke emotional responses. This may suggest 
that the costs of reframing are not as high as one might have expected. A 
final possibility is that the subjects, who were incoming law students, 
perceived that lawyers should behave objectively and unemotionally and 
responded accordingly. 
d. Data Exclusion 
Approximately 20% of participants failed the two-question test to 
assess understanding by answering at least one of the questions 
incorrectly. In particular, participants in group 4—the group that had 
property rights presented under the bundle paradigm with no forewarning 
of limitations—were the most likely to fail the manipulation check. With 
framing experiments, one cannot be certain precisely how the participants 
interpreted the frame. The majority of group 4 subjects were 
excluded(n=44)based on responding incorrectly that the bundle of 
rights/no forewarning purchase policy meant that the law school had 
specifically imposed multiple limitations. The most likely interpretation of 
this result is that the bundle of rights, as we hypothesized, casts property 
 
 
 78. Also, positive mood was not significant: file saving t(224) = 0.003, one-tailed p < 0.499, r2 < 
0.01; laptop sharing t(227) = 1.27, one-tailed p < 0.103, r2 < 0.01; and laptop transfer t(224) = 0.052, 
one-tailed p < 0.479, r2 < 0.01.  
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rights in a language of limitation rather than dominion. However, what we 
did not anticipate was that this sense of limitation may have been so robust 
for some participants that they perceived a bundle comprised of a full 
array of property rights as an explicit restriction by the law school (as was 
the case in the forewarning conditions). In some sense, then, perhaps the 
frame that was conveyed to these participants was not the frame that we 
intended to convey. Importantly, however, the excluded subjects do not 
alter our experimental findings. When we run our statistical tests with 
these excluded subjects added back in, the means for the various measures 
between these excluded subjects and the other participants do not differ in 
a statistically significant way.  
2. Experiment 2 
The data in Experiment 2 confirmed the predictions that subjects 
presented with all four framing conditions would assign the lowest 
willingness to pay to the bundle of rights with forewarning description, the 
highest willingness to pay to the discrete asset, no forewarning 
description, and intermediate values to the bundle of rights without 
forewarning and the discrete asset with forewarning descriptions (see Tbl. 
1 & Fig. 7).  
TABLE 1 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Bundle of 
Rights/Forewarning 
46 $531.08 237.47 
Bundle of Rights/No 
Forewarning 
48 $594.77 250.57 
Discrete 
Asset/Forewarning 
49 $652.53 281.54 
Discrete Asset/No 
Forewarning 
53 $818.87 353.58 
 
 
The predicted pattern was statistically significant, t = 4.2, one-tailed p 
< 0.0001, r
2 
= 0.08 (contrast coefficient 131.09, SE 31.21). The analysis 
excluded instances where students responded with zero valuation, as this 
response appeared to indicate a desire not to participate in a buying pool, 
not an actual valuation of zero. Even with all zero valuations retained in 
the data set, however, the framing and forewarning effects remain highly 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/1
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significant, t = 3.61, one-tailed p < 0.0004, r
2 
= 0.07 (contrast coefficient = 
121.40, SE = 33.60). 
 
FIGURE 7: WILLINGNESS TO PAY IN LAPTOP BUYING POOL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. REFRAMING PROPERTY RIGHTS: IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 
Our empirical findings validate the idea that framing affects 
perceptions, cognitions, and behavioral intentions with respect to property 
rights. In other words, framing matters. This conclusion reveals a 
fundamental flaw in how many commentators understand people to view 
and react to property rights. Scholars usually assume that reactions to 
property rights are exogenous to the way in which those rights are 
presented.
79
 Our findings suggest, quite to the contrary, that people‘s 
reactions to property rights are endogenous to the frame through which 
those rights are presented. Put another way, people‘s reactions to property 
rights, and to limitations on those rights, is not simply a function of the 
rights and limitations themselves. They are, rather, a function of the rights 
and limitations combined with the frame through which the rights and 
limitations are presented. And, as a corollary, they may be changed by 
 
 
 79. See supra Part I.C.  
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varying either the rights (or limitations) or the frame. In this Section, we 
discuss the ramifications of our findings for property theory and law.  
A. The Resilience of the Discrete Asset Paradigm 
Our empirical findings raise problems for an account that 
commentators have advanced for decades (without evidence). Many 
property theorists have touted the strength of the discrete-asset paradigm. 
They assert that lay individuals remain wedded to the discrete-asset 
paradigm.
80
 And, while those trained in the law ascend from the discrete-
asset paradigm to the bundle paradigm, that is only the case after 
considerable legal education.
81
 Both components of the story, then, 
emphasize, if implicitly, the resilience of the discrete-asset paradigm 
against framing.  
Our findings tend to refute this account. They show that, contrary to the 
assertions about the strength and dominance of the discrete-asset 
paradigm,
82
 people without a formal legal education can be liberated from 
the discrete-asset paradigm (assuming that that is their natural frame to 
begin with) fairly easily. After reading a brief purchase policy description, 
participants in our experiment demonstrated framing effects with respect 
to property perceptions and intentions. Years of legal education and 
―frame indoctrination‖ were not required.  
Our findings also bear on claims that possessiveness and strong 
property attachments are evolutionarily hard-wired. First, the relative ease 
of reframing, particularly in the bundle-of-rights conditions, does not 
support a robust evolutionary drive toward absolutism in property 
acquisition and retention.
83
 Second, we question theories of a property 
 
 
 80. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 27 (1988) (―The layman 
thinks of [private property] as a two-place relation of ownership between a person and a thing . . . .‖); 
Grey, supra note 62, at 69 (―Most people . . . conceive of property as things that are owned by 
persons.‖); see also Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 283 (1998).   
 81. See ACKERMAN, supra note 13; Penner, supra note 51, at 712–14 & n.1 (1996); Merrill & 
Smith, supra note 16, at 357–58 (―It is a commonplace of academic discourse that property is simply a 
‗bundle of rights,‘ and that any distribution of rights and privileges among persons with respect to 
things can be dignified with the (almost meaningless) label ‗property.‘ By and large, this view has 
become conventional wisdom among legal scholars: Property is a composite of legal relations that 
holds between persons and only secondarily or incidentally involves a ‗thing.‘‖ (footnotes omitted)).  
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 56–60. Our results are broadly consistent with those in 
Nash, supra note 11, at 711–19; id. at 721 (discussing the results and noting that, ―for all statistically 
significant results, subjects who received surveys that presented property rights under the bundle 
paradigm were more accepting of law school interference with those rights than those whose surveys 
presented the rights under the discrete asset paradigm‖).  
 83. For example, studies reveal that some tribal groups have social norms that foster more 
communal property rights. For discussion of the success and failure of some of these resource 
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―instinct‖ in light of the evolutionary history of humans to live in groups 
and vary their property arrangements and territorial borders in pro-social 
(and adaptive) ways.
84
  
Real-world examples provide evidence of the success of bundle-of-
rights and forewarning reframing. One case in point is the rise and quick 
acceptance of zoning regulation. Zoning represented a substantial 
accretion in government power and imposed very real limitations on 
individuals‘ property rights—including limitations on homeownership. 
Zoning reflects the bundle paradigm, with property owners holding only 
the rights to certain uses and kinds of development. Yet, zoning is 
pervasive and well accepted by the general public, at least compared to 
public reaction to eminent domain.
85
 This state of affairs has ensconced 
itself over time, with vast swaths of the population exposed to zoning as a 
limitations frame. While isolated disputes over zoning persist, the notion 
that the government has the power to zone—and the concomitant point 
that people‘s land use interests are subject to substantial limitation through 
zoning—has been absorbed by the public.86 The acceptance of property 
rights limitations in zoning does not, however, appear to have generalized 
to all property contexts, perhaps because other forms of regulation are 
more sporadic, visible, or emotionally evocative than zoning.   
Another example of successful reframing is landlord property rights 
vis-à-vis tenant rights. While landlords historically enjoyed substantial 
dominion by virtue of property ownership, the evolution of the law in this 
area has substantially eroded landlords‘ rights.87 Landlords may no longer 
 
 
management regimes, see Ezra Rosser, This Land is My Land, This Land is Your Land: Markets and 
Institutions for Economic Development on Native American Land, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 245, 308–10 
(2005). 
 84. For a discussion of evolution and territoriality, see Stephanie Stern, Housing Exceptionalism 
in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). Jeffrey Stake writes about a 
property instinct with respect to temporal priority and possession but notes that ―[o]ur property instinct 
or mental adaptation might be nothing more than a natural inclination to learn the rules that other 
humans use to resolve the coordination problem inherent in resource disputes . . . .‖ Stake, supra note 
29, at 1764. For a discussion of possible evolutionary theories of property rights, see James E. Krier, 
Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 150–59 (2009).   
 85. It is now well accepted that ―[a] person should not purchase property until he has ascertained 
what zoning ordinances, if any, affect it.‖ 3 WARREN'S WEED ON THE NEW YORK LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY § 9.04 (Oscar LeRoy Warren et al., eds.) 4th ed. 2000). Acceptance of zoning is enhanced 
by the continued availability of the Takings Clause for regulatory actions that ―go[] too far,‖ Pa. Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922), and by the Court‘s holding in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 
U.S. 606 (2001), that the mere fact that someone gains title to property after a zoning ordinance has 
already taken effect does not preclude a Takings challenge.  
 86. We are grateful to Nicole Garnett for this point.  
 87. For discussion, see Karl Manheim, Tenant Eviction Protection and the Takings Clause, 1989 
WIS. L. REV. 925, 1009 & n.502; Thomas M. Quinn & Earl Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A 
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avail themselves of self-help,
88
 law empowers tenants to offset rental 
payments for breaches of the implied warranty of habitability,
89
 and 
landlords must abide by publicly approved rental increases in cities with 
rent control and stabilization.
90
 Concededly, landlords have not embraced 
these reforms with enthusiasm—yet still the basic point remains that the 
landlord‘s property interest today, generally speaking, resembles the 
bundle paradigm and has been accepted by the public. 
B. Reframing Property: Property Perceptions and Behavior  
Our findings demonstrate that the framing of property rights affects 
people‘s perceptions of those rights. Our results expand the psychological 
literature validating the power of framing and provide new evidence that 
framing effects extend to property rights. Our research also bridges the 
theoretical divide between property theorists about the proper conception 
of property—and pushes the boundaries of this debate. As Stephen 
Munzer writes, ―[i]t is perfectly sound to think of property both as things 
. . . and as relations among persons or other entities with respect to 
things—provided that the context makes clear which conception is 
meant.‖91 Framing offers law a way not only to make that context clear, 
but to actually shape attitudes and expectations.
92
  
Why is framing property so effective? We contend that framing 
through the bundle of rights casts property in a ―language of limitation.‖ 
Bundle framing does this by breaking out use rights as stand-alone rights 
that may be granted or, presumably, not granted (or even taken away). 
Indeed, in the bundle of rights/no forewarning condition, a significant 
number of participants understood the bundle-of-rights frame to impose 
explicit limitations on their property rights. In addition, by increasing 
cognitive demand, bundle-of-rights framing may encourage participants to 
shift from ―system 1‖ affectively-driven processing to more analytical 
―system 2‖ processing. Forewarning emphasizes, or cognitively primes, 
the prospect of regulation and regulatory loss. Research has shown that 
 
 
Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, 227–35 
(1969); see generally Amanda Quester, Evolution Before Revolution: Dynamism in Connecticut 
Landlord-Tenant Law Prior to the Late 1960s, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 408 (2006).  
 88. See Manheim, supra note 87, at 1009. 
 89. See id. at 1009 n.502.  
 90. See, e.g., Craig Gurian, Let Them Rent Cake: George Pataki, Market Ideology, and the 
Attempt to Dismantle Rent Regulation in New York, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 339, 342 (2004).  
 91. MUNZER, supra note 55, at 17.  
 92. Id.   
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framing a problem as a loss increases cognitive processing and mental 
model complexity.
93
 Similarly, feelings of personal threat increase 
information processing relative to feelings of personal mastery.
94
 Framing 
by forewarning of restrictions or suggesting limitation indirectly through 
the bundle-of-rights paradigm likely causes individuals to perceive a threat 
to their personal situation which increases information processing and 
recall upon subsequent regulation.  
It is important to underscore that our experiments measured 
perceptions and attitudes. We recognize that attitudes do not translate 
automatically into behavior. At the same time, attitudes are of great 
importance in understanding behavior. For one thing, attitudes are surely 
not unrelated to behavior; the empirical literature indicates that attitudes 
translate, albeit imperfectly, into behavior.
95
 Accordingly, we cannot 
conclude from our study, for example, that a subject who indicated a 
particular willingness-to-pay for a laptop would actually offer to pay that 
amount of money.
96
 However, we can infer that framing is likely on 
average to affect actual willingness to pay. Indeed, several studies have 
found a correlation between verbal expressions of willingness to pay and 
actual purchasing behavior.
97
  
Certain factors increase the likelihood that attitudes will translate into 
behavior. These factors include having a vested interest in the outcome, 
how clearly defined the attitude is, the presence of behavioral intentions, 
and whether the attitude is formed on the basis of direct experience.
98
 In 
particular, bringing an attitude to mind plays a key role in prompting 
behavior; the more frequently attitudes are brought to mind, the higher the 
consistency between attitude and action.
99
 Thus, multiple exposures to a 
 
 
 93. See Dhavan V. Shah et al., The Interplay of News Frames on Cognitive Complexity, 30 HUM. 
COMM. RES. 102, 105 (2004).  
 94. See George E. Marcus, The Structure of Emotional Response: 1984 Presidential Candidates, 
82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 737, 737–39 (1988).  
 95. The translation is not one-to-one—but neither is it zero. See Russell H. Fazio, How do 
Attitudes Guide Behavior?, in HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION 205 (E. Tory Higgins & 
Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1986).  
 96. As a general matter, attitudes will most likely translate into actual behavior when the costs of 
undertaking the relevant behavior is low. See id. 
 97. See Green & Blair, supra note 38, at 3 (reviewing studies on verbal versus actual willingness 
to pay). 
 98. See Fazio, supra note 95, at 218–19. 
 99. See ELIOT R. SMITH & DIANE M. MACKIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 305 (3d ed. 2007) (―If 
attitudes are to guide actions, they must be readily accessible and appropriate to their intended 
behavior. Attitudes can be made accessible through deliberate thought, self-awareness, or frequent use, 
[or if they are] specific to a particular behavior . . . .‖). 
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frame, or as we discuss below, exposure to multiple frames, enhances not 
only effects on attitudes but also the translation of attitudes to behaviors.  
C. Framing Synergies 
Our study shows that ―frame layering‖ greatly enhances the success of 
framing. Specifically, we found that employing both forewarning of 
restrictions on property use and the bundle-of-rights paradigm increased 
framing effects synergistically—that is, more than the sum of either 
framing device standing alone. This finding is critical because framing is 
not a costless enterprise, particularly when laypeople encounter complex 
legal frames.
100
 Our research responds directly to this issue by finding a 
simple method, frame layering, which increases the cost-effectiveness of 
framing interventions.  
What is it about the combination of framing property rights in the 
bundle paradigm and framing via forewarning that tends to do a successful 
job at reducing people‘s expectations about their property rights? We 
speculate that bundle framing and forewarning framing attenuate 
expectations because they focus attention on limitations in rights. The 
combination of the two does even more work than either standing alone, 
presumably because each framing mechanism tends to reinforce the other. 
It is jointly, then, that the framing mechanisms are most successful at 
liberating people from the discrete asset mindset and focusing attention on 
property constraints.  
In practice, are there occasions when paradigm framing (i.e., 
bundle/discrete asset) works in concert with the inclusion of forewarning? 
We think the answer to this question is ―yes.‖ In the statutory context, 
sophisticated legal players routinely confront combinations of bundle and 
forewarning framing. Statutes such as the Clean Air Act limit use rights 
with respect to pollution and specify ex ante restrictions.
101
 In other 
instances, background societal norms frame property interests in a 
particular way, with legal rules and disclosures enhancing that frame. 
Creating multiple layers of frames or capitalizing on preexisting framing 
synergies increases the efficacy of rights-limiting regulation and, in some 
cases, may reduce enforcement costs. 
 
 
 100. See infra Part III.E. 
 101. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental 
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1681 (2007).  
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D. A Public Choice Model of Framing 
One of the most powerful aspects of framing is its effect on public 
opinion.
102
 Effective framing alters attitudes. Attitudes in turn create 
political climates. Framing may also have a significant effect on political 
behavior. Attitudes are more likely to translate into behavior when the 
actions in question are low in cost.
103
 Casting a vote in an election or 
referendum and responding to a public opinion phone poll are relatively 
low-cost behaviors.
104
  
Elected representatives are cognizant of constituents‘ voting and 
frequently are responsive to their strongly held attitudes. They may be 
chastened by voters‘ attitudes to adopt or modify laws or implement other 
reforms.
105
 These actions may take the form of legislation that has an 
affirmative impact, or ―symbolic legislation‖ that simply affirms a shared 
understanding.
106
 Even though it lacks substantive ―teeth,‖ symbolic 
legislation may further entrench a particular frame. Political entrepreneurs 
(the class of which may include some politicians) perceive the resonance 
of frames and may react by translating frames into political will for change 
or, as the case may be, for maintaining the status quo.
107
  
As an example, consider the Supreme Court‘s decision in the 
celebrated Kelo v. City of New London
108
 case. In Kelo, the Court upheld a 
state‘s determination that the use of eminent domain to obtain non-
blighted properties for a private redevelopment project was a ―public use‖ 
and therefore permissible under the Constitution‘s Takings Clause.109 
Commentators have noted that the decision in Kelo was entirely consistent 
 
 
 102. There is direct empirical evidence that framing issues, particularly in a way that highlights 
the potential for individual loss from a baseline reference point, increases political behavior (e.g., 
voting). This occurs because framing in the language of loss increases cognitive complexity which in 
turn mediates political behavior. See Shah et al., supra note 93, at 116. 
 103. See BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL 
MOTIVATION 60–63 (1997). 
 104. Of course, the low voter turnout indicates that voting is not costless. However, compared to 
the cost of changing one‘s individual behavior with respect to property or undertaking personal protest 
of a property law, voting is comparably quite low cost. 
 105. Politicians also may take action to strengthen existing frames or to defend them against 
perceived assault.  
 106. See, e.g., Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska, Subglobal Regulation of the Global 
Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 183, 215 (2005) (characterizing state 
efforts to address global warming as symbolic regulation). 
 107. See, e.g., Dale B. Thompson, Political Obstacles to the Implementation of Emissions 
Markets: Lessons from RECLAIM, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 645, 659–60 (2000) (discussing political 
entrepreneurs). 
 108. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 109. Id. at 490 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).  
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with earlier Supreme Court precedent; in short, if the decision worked a 
change in preexisting law, it was not a large one.
110
 Despite this, public 
reaction to the Kelo decision was negative, and nothing short of 
vociferously so.
111
 One might say that the public‘s ―frame‖ of property 
rights did not square with preexisting Supreme Court Takings Clause 
precedent, and Kelo—a dry Supreme Court opinion—was unsuccessful at 
altering that frame.
112
  
In response to the public outcry, federal and state politicians 
considered, and in some cases enacted, statutes to constrain the freedom 
that governments could constitutionally enjoy under Kelo.
113
 For example, 
California amended its Constitution to prohibit state and local 
governments from exercising eminent domain over owner-occupied 
residences for the purpose of economic development with certain 
exceptions for public health and safety needs.
114
 Indiana mandated 
compensation at 150% of fair market value for condemnation of a primary 
residence
115
 and many states adopted legislation limiting eminent domain 
for private redevelopment or urban renewal to ―blighted‖ areas.116 Some of 
 
 
 110. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Six Myths about Kelo, 20 PROB. & PROP. 19, 19–20 (2006); 
Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo is Not Good News for Local Planners and Developers, 22 GA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 803, 803 (2006). But cf. Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic Development 
Takings after Kelo, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 183, 240–44 (2007).  
 111. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 110, at 819–25.  
 112. We note that the Court‘s job is not—or at least the Justices on the Court may not see their job 
to be—reframing ordinary individuals‘ perceptions. But see Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial 
Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257 (2005) (questioning whether the Supreme Court can consistently defy the 
public will); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (arguing that constitutional decision-making is often grounded upon, and 
draws support from, popular opinion). Cf. ACKERMAN, supra note 13, at 113–67 (discussing how 
existing Supreme Court Takings precedent vindicates lay expectations about property rights).  
 113. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 110, at 830–44; Somin, supra, note 110, at 244–59. But cf. Ilya 
Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 
(2009). 
 114. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19 (amendment proposed after a public initiative collected enough 
signatures to qualify this for statewide ballot). Colorado, Connecticut, and New Jersey proposed but 
did not enact similar legislation. 
 115. See H.B. 1010, 114th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) In addition, Connecticut now 
requires the government to pay 125% of the average appraised value of property acquired by eminent 
domain by a development agency, see S.B. 167, 2007 Leg., Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2007), and Kansas 
requires the legislature to consider compensation to all landowners whose property is condemned at 
200% of the appraised value, see S.B. 323, 2007 Leg., Sess. of 2007 (Kan. 2007). 
 116. See, e.g., S.B. 167, 2007 Leg., Jan. Sess., (2007) (eminent domain for urban renewal allowed 
only in blighted areas), S.B. 7, 127th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2007) (at least 70% of parcels must be 
blighted before area can be designated as a blighted area), S. 155, 2007 Leg., 117th Sess. (S.C. 2007) 
(authorizes legislature to enact laws allowing eminent domain to remedy blight with the property put 
to public or private use), H.B. 365, 2007 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2007) (use of eminent domain in 
urban renewal if property is blighted). 
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this legislation was weak or symbolic; in other cases, statutes imposed 
substantial constraints.
117
  
The eminent domain example illustrates how politicians may respond 
to strong public frames regarding private property protection (as well as 
their own frames) through legislative change. These new laws have a 
feedback effect on public perceptions and strengthen already robust 
frames—in some cases to the detriment of other social goals. As 
evidenced by our study, effective framing of property rights ex ante 
through law or norms has the potential to attenuate public response (and 
thus to reduce the likelihood of unconsidered or reactionary legislation in 
the heat of the political moment).  
E. Framing Costs and Considerations 
What are the costs and considerations of reframing, and when can we 
expect reframing to be successful? Our experiments suggest that framing 
can be accomplished at less cost than many commentators have assumed. 
Yet, framing is not costless. Developing and communicating frames 
effectively is a resource-intensive venture.
118
 Moreover, framing is not 
invariably successful. Citizens may fail to notice or attend to property 
frames. The frame that the owner infers may differ from the intended 
frame. For example, the failure of a number of subjects in group 4 to 
answer the manipulation check questions correctly illustrates the 
vulnerability of framing to ambiguity and disuniformity. In this Section, 
we consider cognitive constraints on framing, the risks of disuniform 
framing, normative considerations, and the problem of frame drift. 
1. Cognitive Constraints 
Although our data refute the traditional account that the discrete-asset 
frame is strongly entrenched in the lay mindset, we remain careful not to 
overstate the ease with which reframing might be accomplished. Consider 
that the initial understanding of a property right is a frame. As scholars 
explain, there is cost associated with the initial definition of property 
rights.
119
 Indeed, one can expect property rights to arise only where the 
 
 
 117. See Somin, supra note 113. 
 118. The design of our experimental instruments took a considerable amount of time. Presumably, 
the fact that reframing was sought for reasons other than experimentation would not reduce the time 
investment required. 
 119. For discussion, see Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the 
Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two 
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benefits of having those rights exceed the information costs of delineating, 
monitoring, and enforcing those rights.
120
 Reframing presumably involves 
not only the cost of delineating, monitoring, and enforcing new property 
rights, but also the cost of suppressing the preexisting rights frames. 
Several factors affect the cost of reframing. One factor is surely the 
number and strength of preexisting natural frames. The greater the number 
of preexisting frames and mechanisms underlying those frames, the harder 
and more costly it will be to achieve reframing.
121
 In addition, people may 
have strong preexisting frames and subjective attachments for certain 
types of property,
122
 such as family heirlooms or homes,
123
 and weaker 
attachments to other property.
124
 One might theorize that convincing 
people to abandon their preexisting frames and to accept a different frame 
might be more difficult where attachments to the underlying property are 
stronger.
125
 A second factor is the extent to which the new frame differs 
from the original frame. The more discordant the new frame is as 
compared with the old one, the more difficult, and therefore more costly, it 
will be to convince people to accept the new frame. In contrast, marginal 
reframing can be attained more cheaply and easily. A third factor is the 
duration that one desires the reframing to persist. It is reasonable to expect 
that more extensive and time-consuming reframing will be required to 
durably ensconce the new frame in individuals‘ minds. A fourth factor 
might be whether reframing addresses educated or sophisticated players. 
While individual property owners may adhere to less nuanced conceptions 
 
 
Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002); Henry E. Smith, 
Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445 (2008).  
 120. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. Proc. 347 
(1967); Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency versus Public Choice: The Case of Property Rights 
in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. REV. 673, 679–81 (2008) (describing the theory that property 
rights evolve based upon economic considerations).   
 121. See Chong & Druckman, supra note 35, at 108–09. For discussion of the difficulties and 
costs of reframing in various contexts, see Sean Hannon Williams, Sticky Expectations: Responses to 
Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 733 (2009).  
 122. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).  
 123. See Jeannie Suk, Taking the Home, 20 L. & LITERATURE 291, 295–98 (2008) (describing the 
potential loss of a home to eminent domain or foreclosure as particularly likely to generate anxiety). 
But see Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. 
L. REV. 1093 (2009).  
 124. See, e.g., David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652 
(2010) (discussing ―patent trolls‖). Of course, a piece of property, like a patent, to which people might 
ordinarily not develop a strong attachment might, in particular cases, still generate a strong connection.  
 125. See Nadler & Diamond, supra note 43 (presenting empirical evidence that people‘s 
opposition to governmental takings increases the greater the attachment the former owner had to the 
property that was taken).   
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of property ownership, sophisticated actors, such as corporations and their 
legal counsel, are familiar with law and legal institutions. As such, they 
are more likely to understand legal limits on the uses of their property.
126
  
2. Disuniform Framing and Market Fungibility 
Although reframing is usually successful, its effects may not be 
identical across all participants. This creates disuniform framing where the 
actual effect deviates from the intended one. To achieve the fine-tuning 
necessary to reframe uniformly might be quite costly. Much as people are 
sometimes overwhelmed with information provided in disclosures
127
 and 
on labels,
128
 people might be unable, or at least strongly disinclined, to sort 
through all the information necessary to convey meaningful, uniform 
reframing.  
On the other hand, one might choose to accept less costly, but also 
more likely disuniform and unpredictable, reframing. The introduction of 
disuniform reframing—that is, a situation where some people have one 
frame of reference for property rights and another group has another, or 
perhaps a situation where people have different understandings of property 
rights with respect to different classes of property—may introduce its own 
costs. Disuniformity in property rights impairs the fungibility of property 
and thus adversely affects market trading in property rights.
129
 One of the 
 
 
 126. This is a possible reason as to why law students, and ultimately lawyers, are better able to 
internalize the bundle paradigm, despite having been reared in the discrete asset paradigm. Cf. Kyle D. 
Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
211, 229 (2003) (explaining that, insofar as presumption against legal transition relief is designed to 
encourage societal actors to anticipate legal change, the presumption should apply more strongly to 
sophisticated actors, for they are better positioned to anticipate legal change).  
 127. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage 
Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan 
Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1133 (1984) (―Some psychological studies suggest that the 
processing capacity of short term memory is five to seven ‗chunks' of information—beyond that, 
processing problems occur. These ‗information overload‘ studies may not represent the final word on 
the subject, but there is substantial agreement that decisionmakers cannot effectively process numerous 
chunks of information.‖) (footnote omitted); Patrick K. Hetrick, Drafting Common Interest Community 
Documents: Minimalism in an Era of Micromanagement, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 409, 414–20 (2008) 
(―The quest for certainty and clarity in document drafting reaches a point of diminishing returns as the 
clauses, cross-references, and pages accumulate to the point of wearing out the reader.‖); Nancy Ann 
Connery, The ―How To‖ Manual for Closing a Residential Sale, in PLI‘S MCLE BRIDGE THE GAP 
PROGRAM MATERIALS 391, 438 (1999) (noting that, among the documents at a real estate closing are 
―a truth-in-lending disclosure statement . . . which invariably confuses the buyer,‖ and ―a HUD 
settlement statement, which discloses (in a completely confusing fashion) all closing expenses‖).  
 128. See, e.g., Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the ―Right to Know‖ from the 
―Need to Know‖ about Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 369 (1994).  
 129. See generally James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of 
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000). Cf. Janet C. Neuman, Have We Got a Deal for You: 
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values of property law—and, arguably one of the reasons that property law 
has evolved as it has—is that the limited number of building blocks from 
which property may legally be assembled makes it possible for the rights 
and liabilities that inhere in owners and third parties to be disseminated as 
unambiguously as possible and understood by large numbers of people.
130
 
It is for this reason that policymakers seeking to develop functioning 
markets in environmental degradation rights must take care to define 
rights broadly and clearly.
131
 Similarly, the law of negotiable instruments 
renders personal defenses unavailable to holders in due course in order to 
provide clearly delineated property rights that render the instruments 
tradable.
132
 With respect to property frames, the cost of ―reframing‖ 
understandings of property across swaths of the public could be sizeable.  
3. Normative Considerations and Utility Reduction  
Beyond the simple balancing of benefits and costs—or perhaps 
included in it—one also needs to consider the normative implications of 
reframing. In this Article, we focus predominantly on attenuating property 
rights through bundle/forewarning framing in the specific contexts of 
property and environmental law.
133
 We acknowledge, however, that there 
are many situations where strong rights, or even strong misperceptions of 
rights, are desirable for economic investment, political stability, or 
personal utility.  
Normative misframing occurs when framing weakens property rights 
when in fact stronger rights are needed (or vice versa) to promote 
efficiency, investment, or other goals.
134
 For example, the avoidance and 
 
 
Can the East Borrow from the Western Water Marketing Experience?, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 449, 
488–89 (2004) (lack of definition in water rights makes development of market in water rights 
difficult).  
 130. See generally Merrill & Smith, supra note 16; Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: 
Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003). 
 131. See Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 129, at 638–42. 
 132. On the goals and history of the law governing negotiable instruments and commercial paper, 
see Curtis Nyquist, A Spectrum Theory of Negotiability, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 897, 900–01 (1995); 
M.B.W. Sinclair, Codification of Negotiable Instruments Law: A Tale of Reiterated Anachronism, 21 
U. TOL. L. REV. 625, 628–68 (1990) (history of legislative enactments); Edward L. Rubin, Learning 
from Lord Mansfield: Toward a Transferability Law for Modern Commercial Practice, 31 IDAHO L. 
REV. 775, 795–98 (1995).  
 133. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1849 (2007); Merrill, supra note 61; Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right?, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329 (1996); EPSTEIN, supra note 1, and the authorities cited therein. 
 134. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, How to Create—or Destroy—Wealth in Real Property, 58 ALA. 
L. REV. 741 (2007) (noting that strong conceptions of property are important as a bulwark against 
excessive state regulation). Cf. Amnon Lehavi, The Property Puzzle, 96 GEO. L.J. 1987, 1991 (2008) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol87/iss3/1
  
 
 
 
 
2010] PROPERTY FRAMES 491 
 
 
 
 
resolution of minor disputes may not be worth the sacrifice that large-scale 
watering down of property rights might entail. When policy makers make 
the wrong normative choice, framing (because of its effectiveness) 
amplifies the negative consequences of that error. Property institutions 
often reflect, and evolve naturally with, society‘s core values and artificial 
framing may short-circuit that process.
135
 In addition, because framing 
focuses and narrows citizens‘ thoughts, it may suppress individual insight 
and group deliberation and thus reduce the likelihood that normative errors 
will be corrected.
136
  
Our evidence suggests additional reasons for using bundle-of-rights 
and forewarning framing selectively. In our study, these frames decreased 
valuation and preference-satisfaction. We found that subjects attached less 
financial value to the laptop and were less satisfied with the legal rule (i.e., 
purchase policy) in the bundle of rights and forewarning conditions.
137
 Of 
course, there may be ways to structure framing to minimize this problem. 
A recent study suggests that dissatisfaction may be ameliorated with 
framing that emphasizes the ultimate benefits to citizens of regulation or 
resource allocation.
138
 Nonetheless, we emphasize the importance of 
targeting framing interventions to problem areas in law where social gains 
exceed individual utility losses.  
4. Frame Drift 
Our data offer no insights as to the durability of reframing and 
longevity of entitlement expectations.
139
 The surveys did not take 
 
 
(arguing that ―dramatic‖ and broad decisions about property rights should be made explicitly by 
publicly ―reasoned resolutions of government entities entrusted with the power and duty of collective 
decisionmaking,‖ subject to the supervision of courts).  
 135. See Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic 
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009); Merrill & Smith, supra note 133; Davidson, supra note 55.  
 136. One study found that framing an issue in terms of a value (in this case equality) increased 
inter-subject agreement but led subjects to express fewer thoughts about the issue. See Paul R. Brewer 
& Kimberly Gross, Values, Framing, and Citizens‘ Thoughts about Policy Issues: Effects on Content 
and Quantity, 26 POL. PSYCHOL. 929, 929–43 (2005).  
 137. The lower satisfaction with the policy is consonant with research showing that individuals 
prefer certainty and overweigh the value of certain outcomes relative to probable outcomes, even when 
the economic value is identical. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 7; see also Chris Guthrie, 
Prospect Theory, Risk Preference, and the Law, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1115, 1119 (2003) (describing 
applications of prospect theory to various legal issues).  
 138. See Eyal Gamliel & Eyal Peer, Positive versus Negative Framing Affects Justice Judgments, 
19 SOC. JUST. RES. 307, 312 (2006) (framing situations to emphasize benefits rather than burdens 
increased perceptions that the situation was just). 
 139. Cf. Scott Davies, From Moral Duty to Cultural Rights: A Case Study of Political Framing in 
Education, 72 SOC. EDUC. 1, 6 (1999) (―Framing strategies are far from foolproof; they are often 
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participants very long to complete. To the extent that reframing was 
achieved, we do not know whether that reframing persists for any 
substantial length of time. It may be that some, or all, participants who 
acclimated to a new frame reverted to a default or other frame after some 
period of time. It may also be that ―sticky‖ reframing is possible but 
requires more extensive, and costly, reframing efforts. These are issues we 
could not investigate within our study design but which would be 
productively addressed by future research.
140
 
IV. APPLICATIONS 
In this Part, we discuss areas where it might be possible, and 
normatively desirable, to attain reframing via the bundle paradigm and 
forewarning.
141
 Among many potential applications of our research, we 
consider conservation on private land, pollution, common interest 
communities, and intellectual property rights. Specifically, we discuss the 
potential of framing in the environmental law context of species 
preservation and marketable pollution permits.
142
 We also examine the 
interplay of property frames and legal disputes in common interest 
communities and in the first sale doctrine of copyright law. 
A. Property Rights and Environmental Regulation: Species Preservation 
on Private Land and Tradable Pollution Permits 
Consider the setting of environmental law. Here, property owners often 
fail to take into account the external harms they impose upon neighbors 
and society in general. In response, environmental laws generally seek to 
reduce the problematic activities, to force actors to internalize the 
 
 
rebutted by opponents who are seeking to undermine and discredit the claims. Transforming or 
extending frames poses risks for interest groups, since by moving into new discursive territory and by 
allying with new causes, they may gain new opponents.‖) (citation omitted).  
 140. In addition, future research could productively explore the interaction between framing and 
perceptions of procedural justice. For research in this area, see Zinta S. Byrne & Deborah E. Rupp, 
Expectations, Voice, and Outcome: Framing Effects on Fairness Judgments, 5, 15–17, (2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://lamar.colostate.edu/~zinta/research.htm). 
 141. We recognize that one might use the bundle paradigm to the contrary to strengthen property 
rights: One could emphasize that each stick in the bundle constitutes a valuable property right such 
that its removal entitles one to compensation. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 1. This is not the type of bundle 
reframing we examined in our study.  
 142. Cf. Hannah Jacobs Wiseman, Notice and Expectation Under Bounded Uncertainty: Defining 
Evolving Property Rights Boundaries Through Public Trust and Takings, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 
262–63 (2008) (discussing how existing property law fails to communicate the clear boundaries of 
property rights in this context).   
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externalities, or both. Despite these justifications for environmental 
regulations, individual property owners in some cases have had very 
negative reactions to government regulation of their property rights. One 
example is the substantial resistance by property owners, especially in the 
western United States, to enforcement of the Endangered Species Act.
143
  
Reframing efforts, not only in the context of stand-alone statutes but 
more pervasively throughout property law, can alter owners‘ perceptions 
of their rights vis-à-vis the environment. For example, formalizing or 
broadening the use of wildlife or conservation zones may create framing 
effects in some landowners. This approach builds upon the preexisting 
frame of zoning, which is widely accepted and arguably an internalized 
frame, and extends it to habitat or wildlife preservation. Similarly, the use 
of conservation easements frames property rights by emphasizing bundle 
ownership and explicitly removing one stick (i.e., the right to develop) 
from the bundle. In a conservation easement, a landowner donates the 
development rights in her land to a land trust or other nonprofit in 
exchange for tax benefits. The easement, and the subsequent owner 
education and ongoing property monitoring by land trusts, reinforce the 
frame.
144
 Conservation easements have enjoyed national success with a 
variety of donors, including ranchers and other owners of working 
lands.
145
  
Market-based pollution permits offer another example of a legal form 
that capitalizes on framing. These regimes limit the amount of pollution 
that a property owner may emit to the number of tradable pollution 
permits that the property owner holds. Each permit authorizes its holder to 
emit a fixed amount of the pollutant per year (or other relevant time 
period). Permits may be traded freely among societal actors.
146
 The 
 
 
 143. See, e.g., Environmental Law, Wetlands Regulation, and Reform of the Endangered Species 
Act, Conference Transcript, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL‘Y REV. 747, 749 (2007) (statement of 
U.S. Rep. Richard Pombo) (―Over the years, we‘ve seen the [Endangered Species Act] be interpreted 
in different ways and implemented in different ways, and it has caused a number of conflicts with 
private property owners and with the desires of people. And that conflict has manifested itself mainly 
throughout the western part of the United States, but increasingly in other parts of the country.‖); 
Robert Meltz, Where the Wild Things Are: The Endangered Species Act and Private Property, 24 
ENVTL. L. 369, 369–70 (1994) (summarizing the debate over the Endangered Species Act and private 
property interests).  
 144. See generally Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation 
Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421 (2005) (describing conservation easements and ways to 
adapt or remove easements over time).  
 145. See Stern, supra note 23. 
 146. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Markets and Geography: 
Designing Marketable Permit Schemes to Control Local and Regional Pollutants, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
569, 575–76 (2001).  
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introduction of tradable pollution permit regimes has effectively reframed 
pollution to industrial actors as a limited use right. Permit trading systems 
have been used successfully to control air and water pollution.
147
 In 
particular, the Clean Air Act‘s national sulfur dioxide emission trading 
system has dramatically reduced acid rain.
148
 In keeping with the notion 
that sophisticated actors may acclimate more readily to technical and 
complex reframings, tradable pollution permit systems have not been 
applied to private citizens.
149
  
While tradable permits have altered expectations of industrial actors, 
these regimes have been less successful at reframing rights in the eyes of 
some environmental groups and private citizens.
150
 They charge that the 
permits communicate an ethos of nonregulation and ―paying to pollute‖—
in essence an undesirable value frame. One of us has argued that these 
objections rely upon erroneous framings of the regulatory options among 
the general public and environmental community.
151
 In particular, tradable 
pollution permits are framed to minimize the role of government in 
limiting pollution and to emphasize market forces as the sole control on 
pollution.
152
 These frames persist even though, in reality, more common 
―command-and-control‖ regimes that directly limit polluting activities also 
convey in some sense a ―right to pollute‖ and indirectly rely upon market 
forces to establish limits on pollution.
153
  
B. Property Rights in Common Interest Communities 
Another setting in which reframing may be appropriate is the purchase 
by individuals of property interests that combine elements of private and 
 
 
 147. See Shi-Ling Hsu, Fairness Versus Efficiency in Environmental Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 
383–89 (2004). Currently, tradable pollution permits are poised to serve as the cornerstone of a global 
regime to reduce climate change.  
 148. See Nash, supra note 29, at 323–24.  
 149. See Thompson, supra note 107, at 645, 665–67 (explaining political economy that 
successfully defeated efforts to include use of consumer products in regional air pollution emissions 
permit trading program).  
 150. See Nash, supra note 29, at 325–34.  
 151. See id. (arguing that framing effects help to explain persistence of economically 
unjustifiable critiques of market-based forms of environmental regulation, and thus may explain the 
continued dominance of command-and-control regulation).  
 152. This framing suggests or emphasizes the ―commodification‖ of the environment.  
 153. Some have suggested that the very terminology used to describe the permits itself frames the 
permits, unnecessarily, as an undesirable regulatory response. See Carol M. Rose, Rethinking 
Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 36 
(1991); Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much Market? Conflict Between Tradable Pollution Allowances 
and the ―Polluter Pays‖ Principle, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 465, 531 (2000); Nash, supra note 29, at 
370–71.  
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commons ownership—―common-interest communities.‖ Common-interest 
communities include homeowners‘ associations for single-family homes, 
cooperatives, condominiums, and timeshares. These ownership forms 
sometimes generate confusion for owners and would-be owners, who 
think they are buying one thing but in fact are getting another.
154
 Owners‘ 
expectations of the strength and scope of their property rights frequently 
create contention within these communities leading to a substantial docket 
of litigation.
155
  
Common-interest communities engender conflict between the 
preexisting frames of many owners and the governing legal rules. 
Purchasers may believe they are obtaining more legal rights then the law 
in fact accords them. This problem occurs in a variety of common-interest 
communities, but may be particularly marked in single-family 
subdivisions with homeowners‘ associations. Owners move into what 
appears to be a traditional single-family structure and take with them a set 
of expectations regarding single-family ownership dominion—the ―home 
as castle.‖156 These expectations are reinforced by the physical aspects of 
the property that the owner experiences on a daily basis: a stand-alone 
housing structure, private yard, exclusive driveway, etc. When the 
homeowners‘ association imposes restrictions, such as limiting house paint 
color, prohibiting remodeling work, or regulating common area usage, 
there is often a clash between the owners‘ perception of their property 
rights and the legal reality of common interest ownership.
157
  
This conflict is exacerbated by the incentive for sellers to mis-frame 
the rights being purchased at the time of sale. The seller—often a 
developer or promoter marketing a common-interest community—is 
motivated to use marketing materials to frame the rights being purchased 
 
 
 154. For example, in some cases buyers of timeshares are victims of ―fraudulent misframing‖ 
where savvy marketers misrepresent the scope of the property rights or capitalize on buyers‘ reference 
point of fee simple ownership. See, e.g., Carl W. Herstein, Real Property, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1037, 
1086 (2000) (―Anyone who has vacationed at the same spot, at the same time for 5, 10, or 20 years 
would almost invariably agree that they have a strong psychological sense of place and attachment, 
which would only be enhanced by interval ownership because it marries these preexisting feelings 
with a sense of entitlement and proprietorship.‖); Hetrick, supra note 127, at 419–20; Ellen R. Peirce 
& Richard A. Mann, Time-Share Interests in Real Estate: A Critical Evaluation of the Regulatory 
Environment, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 9, 58 (1983) (noting that timeshare ―purchasers are more likely 
to rely upon the seller‘s advertising and sales pitch than upon detailed and typically turgid registration 
statements‖); see also Heller, supra note 59, at 1183–85 (noting the difficulties posed by the rise of 
various forms of common-interest communities, and observing that such communities ―illustrate the 
difficulty of distinguishing good from bad fragmentation‖).  
 155. See Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 830–35 (2004).  
 156. See Stern, supra note 123. 
 157. See Fennell, supra note 155, at 849–51.  
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as broadly as possible. There are two reasons for this. First, a purchaser 
who believes she is getting more rights will be willing to pay a higher 
price. This creates an incentive for the seller to market the property using 
as broad a frame as possible and to de-emphasize the bundle-of-rights and 
common-ownership aspects. Second, absent fraud or other unlawful acts, 
the seller will not be liable if an owner later finds that the rights purchased 
are less copious than she thought at the time of purchase. 
In the absence of effective regulation, the seller has little interest in 
making sure that the frame presented to the purchaser matches the legal 
reality that the owner will face down the road. For example, one common-
interest community where rights frequently fall short of expectations is the 
timeshare. Timeshares are a highly circumscribed form of ownership 
where multiple parties hold limited-use rights, typically in the form of 
allocated time at a resort or vacation property. Considerable thought and 
effort is put into timeshare marketing that emphasizes the ownership 
interest and downplays limitations and restrictions. It is then not surprising 
that timeshares are a frequent source of conflict and litigation.
158
 
The incentive for developers and real estate agents to inaccurately 
frame ownership rights bears on the debate over housing and fraud 
regulation. Commentators have criticized fraud and other building 
regulation for reducing the supply and increasing the cost of housing.
159
 
Our work suggests that a baseline of fraud and transaction regulation may 
be essential to counteract seller incentives for strategic mis-framing. The 
findings in our study illustrate the relative ease of framing property 
interests to potential owners, including exaggerated and fabricated frames. 
In the case of common interest communities, markets do not readily self-
correct to address mis-framing. Information costs for buyers are high 
because of the large numbers of small-scale developers, the varying rather 
than standardized nature of housing products, and ability of developers to 
structure their projects as separate companies or ventures and to use 
multiple business names. We do not claim that all levels and types of 
regulation are desirable and our research does not answer the question of 
―how much‖ regulation is efficient. But, the power of framing and the 
incentives for fraudulent mis-framing support a role for regulation and 
anti-fraud measures. 
 
 
 158. For discussion, see James J. Scavo, Marketing Resort Timeshares: The Rules of the Game, 73 
ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 217, 222–23 (1999). 
 159. The costs of regulation are evidence not only in transaction and fraud regulation but also in 
land use and building regulation. For a review of this literature, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. 
BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 28–29 (3d ed. 2005). 
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Moving from the general case for regulation to specific regulatory 
strategies, one answer to the framing incentive problem is to mandate 
disclosure on the part of sellers of common interest community housing. 
Indeed, this is the primary regulatory approach in many states.
160
 But 
disclosure has its limitations.
161
 For one thing, much as having too many 
warnings on a product may overwhelm consumers,
162
 prospective 
purchasers may have difficulty in digesting large amounts of disclosures. 
For another, the complexity of the warnings may be unclear to lay would-
be purchasers.
163
 
Our study suggest some ways to improve disclosure (or frame-setting). 
Disclosures should be made in ―plain language‖ and succinctly.164 
Lawyering rights descriptions with explicit forewarning of ownership 
limitations may also increase disclosure efficacy. For example, a short 
overview of the disclosures followed by material identifying the property 
form and listing limitations would be appropriate. Perhaps even an 
evocative name or property form such as ―limited fee simple‖ or ―fee 
simple in a limited interest community‖ for condominium or subdivision 
owners would further reinforce the appropriate frame. Even if the buyer 
does not fully understand the property form or limitations, she typically 
communicates with her bank, broker, and other agents who are likely to 
explain, or at least cite, the property rights legal structure.
165
 
Even with these changes, disclosure standing alone may still come up 
short.
166
 Our finding about frame layering suggests that disclosure is best 
 
 
 160. See, e.g., Vincent Di Lorenzo, Disclosure as Consumer Protection: Unit Purchasers‘ Need 
for Additional Protections, 73 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 43, 45–51 (1999) (describing New York‘s 
approach). 
 161. See id. at 51–73 (arguing that New York‘s disclosure approach leaves purchasers at risk). 
 162. See, e.g., Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the ―Right to Know‖ from the 
―Need to Know‖ About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 369 (1994). 
 163. See, e.g., Di Lorenzo, supra note 160, at 67 (―Experienced individuals in the field of co-
op/condominium offerings agree that individual consumers cannot be expected to understand an 
offering plan, and that they require expert assistance from attorneys, accountants, and real estate 
salespeople. While most buyers obtain the assistance of counsel, the assistance of other experts—e.g., 
accountants—is rarely sought. Moreover, given the cognitive barriers to appreciation of risks, one 
wonders if the assistance of counsel is effectively assisting purchasers in adequately perceiving and 
evaluating the risks of purchase.‖ (footnote omitted)). 
 164. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (mandating use of plain English in securities disclosure documents). 
See Judith D. Fischer, Why George Orwell‘s Ideas About Language Still Matter for Lawyers, 68 
MONT. L. REV. 129, 144–45 (2007) (discussing numerous instances of legal requirements for the use 
of plain English). 
 165. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 127, at 1112 (―The homebuyer is typically educated, not by 
reading complicated disclosures, but by talking to bankers, builders, and brokers—intermediaries who 
often benefit from giving advice.‖). 
 166. See Di Lorenzo, supra note 160. 
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employed in coordination with other framing devices. This can occur at 
various points in the transaction and ownership process. Post-acquisition, 
for example, homeowners‘ associations can convey and maintain frames 
experentially. Here, one form of common-interest community—the 
cooperative—illustrates the importance of setting and reinforcing 
frames.
167
 Because owners buy shares in the cooperative rather than 
purchasing their individual apartment or townhome-style unit in fee 
simple, it behooves cooperatives to be particularly adept at rights framing. 
If purchasers do not fully appreciate the distinction, there is a greater 
likelihood for problems to arise because of the risk-sharing structure of 
ownership as well as density-related conflicts.
168
 The cooperative 
ownership form is in and of itself a powerful legal frame. Prior to 
purchase, buyers must undergo a rigorous interview and screening process 
that aids in the initial phase of frame-setting.
169
 In addition, cooperatives 
periodically inoculate against ―frame drift‖ through cooperative meetings, 
voting practices, and vetting of potential buyers by cooperative 
members.
170
 
Extrapolating from the cooperative model, attention by homeowners‘ 
associations and property managers to early communications with new 
owners, as well as ongoing association meetings to discuss common areas 
and rights limitations, are important framing devices. Indeed, 
homeowners‘ association meetings may be as valuable for frame-
maintenance as for addressing administrative matters. As common-interest 
communities continue to grow (and to trend toward professional 
management), developing innovative techniques for experiential frame-
setting and maintenance is a productive avenue for reducing conflict and 
non-compliance.  
Of course, other normative debates arise in structuring common-
interest communities;
171
 the resolution of those debates may affect the type 
 
 
 167. See, e.g., Richard J. Kane, The Financing of Cooperatives and Condominiums: A 
Retrospective, 73 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 101, 119 (1999). 
 It may be the case that cooperatives founder on other dimensions, such as a tendency to adopt 
overly restrictive regulations or use conflicts from higher-density housing. From the perspective of 
framing, however, cooperatives provide one model for frame-creation and maintenance. 
 168. Cf. Fennell, supra note 155, at 849–64. 
 169. See, e.g., Rosemarie Maldonado & Robert D. Rose, The Application of Civil Rights Laws to 
Housing Cooperatives: Are Co-Ops Bastions of Discriminatory Exclusion or Self-Selecting Models of 
Community-Based Living?, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1245, 1247–48 (1996). 
 170. Condominiums may also fare better on this score thanks to their relative ubiquity and the 
relatively clear documentation the banking industry has required in order to provide mortgage loans. 
See Mark Fenster, Community by Covenant, Process, and Design: Cohousing and the Contemporary 
Common Interest Community, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 3, 20 (1999). 
 171. See Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and 
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and scope of reframing that is viable in a given context. One might 
discover as a result of normative conflicts over the purpose and role of 
common-interest communities and their governance (i.e., communitarian, 
democratic, or mixed models) that uniform reframing is prohibitively 
expensive. As we discussed previously, the costs and contextual success of 
reframing remain quite relevant to the question of when framing will have 
the most impact on law and the particular framing strategies best-suited to 
individual property issues. At a minimum, however, a case can be made 
for some form of government intervention in the market for common-
interest communities to remedy the information failures—indeed, the 
framing failures—that inhere in such markets.  
C. Intellectual Property Rights: The First Sale and Exhaustion Doctrines 
Intellectual property confronts many instances where holders of 
intellectual property rights wish to reframe that property so as to limit 
purchasers‘ rights.172 In particular, holders often want to limit the ability of 
purchasers to transfer or reproduce protected work or inventions. Some of 
the most contentious issues, and divided case law, in intellectual property 
focus on what are in essence framing conflicts.
173
 One illustrative example 
is the first sale doctrine in copyright (a similar principle, referred to as 
patent exhaustion, applies to patented property). The first sale doctrine 
allows the purchaser of copyrighted material to transfer the particular copy 
she has obtained so long as she does not make additional copies.
174
 For 
example, a purchaser may lawfully sell a book she purchased but she may 
not scan the book into electronic format and sell dozens of electric copies. 
Through the lens of framing, we can view the first sale doctrine as legally 
framing the purchaser‘s rights to allow a salient and expected use: a one-
time transfer of the purchased work.  
 
 
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989) (discussing conflict between interest-group pluralism and 
communitarian conceptions of common-interest property arrangements); Gerrit De Geest, The 
Provision of Public Goods in Apartment Buildings, 12 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 299 (1992) (detailing 
relevant governance issues and explaining how doctrines of law and economics would suggest 
resolving them). Cf. Fenster, supra note 170, at 24–44 (offering case studies of common-interest 
communities, including discussion of the varied normative values important to different communities). 
 172. For a discussion of the importance of property rhetoric to many current debates involving the 
scope of intellectual property rights, see Fagundes, supra note 124, at 9–15.  
 173. For example, the debate over fair use may provide another interesting application of framing, 
particularly to the extent that the doctrine reflects a degree of acceptance of limitation of owners‘ 
rights.   
 174. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006). 
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The question that has arisen is whether the copyright holder may 
override the first sale doctrine through explicit restrictions on transfer, or a 
―shrinkwrap‖ license arrangement. There is a split of opinion among the 
circuits with respect to this issue. One of the most recent cases to address 
this point, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto,
175
 held that Augusto, who 
had obtained and sold on eBay promotional CDs originally provided to 
music industry insiders, was protected by the first sale doctrine.
176
 The 
court found that a purported license to the ―intended recipient for personal 
use only‖ did not create a valid license as the substance of the transaction 
bore the indicia of a gift transfer.
177
 The decision balances multiple 
concerns in intellectual property, including preventing restraint of trade 
and limiting the availability of creative works. With respect to framing, the 
decision also suggests that the court did not view UMG‘s attempted 
reframing through the shrinkwrap license as rigorous enough to override 
either the first sale doctrine or the intellectual property purchaser‘s 
frame.
178
  
The emerging case law on the first sale doctrine implicates the issues of 
default frames and of framing efficacy. One reason for upholding the first 
sale doctrine is that it squares with purchaser‘s property frame—at the 
least, purchasers of copyrighted material expect to be able to sell or 
transfer that material.
179
 In the Augusto case, for example, UMG did not 
take action or evidence intent to regain control and so Augusto‘s only 
notice of limitation was a boilerplate ―shrinkwrap‖ license—a limitation 
that did not align with ordinary perceptions of original CDs as property 
that can be resold.
180
 Russell Korobkin suggests that when contract terms 
are not salient to consumers, the law should increase the use of mandatory, 
standardized terms and allow limited judicial review of seller-drafted 
terms.
181
 Our framing research extends this point further: efficiency and 
fairness are best served when non-salient contract forms square with 
 
 
 175. 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2008).  
 176. See id. at 1065.  
 177. See id. at 1058, 1060–61. 
 178. See id. at 1060.  
 179. It is also possible that the original owner‘s expectation that she can limit acquirer rights as a 
condition of transfer comports with the owner‘s frame or understanding of property. However, the 
atypical nature of the restriction at issue in first sale and the likelihood that the acquirer is not a 
sophisticated party suggests that the acquirer‘s frame, and the balance of the equities in favor of the 
acquirer, may be stronger in such conflicts.   
 180. Indeed, the frame with respect to CDs or DVDs can be quite expansive. Companies routinely 
struggle to prevent purchasers from copying music or movies and reselling those copies. 
 181. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and 
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1245 (2003). 
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purchasers‘ or acquirers‘ frames. Intellectual property holders who wish to 
limit purchasers should bear the burden of demonstrating rigorous and 
effective reframing of purchaser property rights.
182
  
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have evaluated empirically the question of whether it 
is possible to ―reframe‖ people‘s perceptions of property interests. 
Contrary to the implicit assumptions of many commentators, we have 
provided evidence of successful reframing of ownership perceptions and 
reactions to regulation. In particular, we have identified two factors that 
tend to reduce people‘s expectations about the strength of their property 
rights: (i) framing the property rights under the ―bundle-of-rights‖ as 
opposed to the ―discrete-asset‖ paradigm; and (ii) including a forewarning 
about limitations in the property rights. The reduction in people‘s 
expectation is largest when both factors are employed. Certainly, 
reframing has its costs—especially uniform and predictable reframing. 
This suggests the need to employ reframing selectively. Reframing may 
not be desirable in all circumstances and there may be conflicts in 
particular instances as to whether framing should be used to weaken or 
strengthen property rights. Many normative issues attend the question of 
how strong people‘s expectations about their property rights ought to be.  
 
 
 182. Cf. Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, (U. of Va. Sch. of Law, Law & 
Economics Research Papers, Working Paper No. 03-9, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
477541 (comparing intellectual and real property servitudes and arguing that the reasons for limiting 
an intellectual property owner‘s right to impose post-transfer exceptions on use and resale are more 
exceptional than commonly assumed). 
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APPENDIX A: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LAPTOP PURCHASE POLICY  
  N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
 
Perceptions of  
Ownership 
Scale  
Discrete 
Asset/Forewarning 
75 3.35 .99 
Bundle of Rights/ 
Forewarning 
73 2.01 .60 
Discrete Asset/No 
Forewarning 
67 4.24 .91 
Bundle of Rights/No 
Forewarning 
27 2.73 .97 
 
Laptop 
Valuation 
(dollars) 
Discrete 
Asset/Forewarning 
74 $1158.78 533.75 
Bundle of Rights/ 
Forewarning 
67 $600.75 525.02 
Discrete Asset/No 
Forewarning 
65 $1249.23 483.19 
Bundle of Rights/No 
Forewarning 
26 $946.92 574.36 
 
Likelihood of 
Installing 
Upgrades 
Discrete 
Asset/Forewarning 
76 2.96 1.16 
Bundle of 
Rights/Forewarning 
73 2.58 1.24 
Discrete Asset/No 
Forewarning 
66 3.26 1.23 
Bundle of Rights/No 
Forewarning 
27 3.11 1.12 
 
Satisfaction with 
Laptop Purchase 
Policy 
Discrete 
Asset/Forewarning 
75 2.19 .98 
Bundle of 
Rights/Forewarning 
73 1.93 .82 
Discrete Asset/No 
Forewarning 
66 2.48 1.0 
Bundle of Rights/No 
Forewarning 
27 2.37 .79 
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APPENDIX B: RESPONSES TO RESTRICTIVE POLICIES DESCRIPTIVE 
STATISTICS 
  N Mean SD 
Perceptions of Rights 
Infringement 
    
File Saving Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 67 4.01 .90 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 27 4.33 .70 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 74 4.32 .95 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 65 4.65 .50 
Laptop Sharing Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 72 4.20 .88 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 27 4.52 .56 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 74 4.71 .41 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 67 4.76 .53 
Laptop Transfer Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 70 3.34 .98 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 27 3.73 .94 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 74 4.00 1.02 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 66 4.11 1.05 
 
Likelihood of Complying 
  
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
File Saving Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 69 2.77 1.24 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 27 2.15 1.32 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 75 2.37 1.42 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 66 2.11 1.12 
Laptop Sharing Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 72 2.74 1.29 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 27 2.48 1.16 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 75 2.32 1.37 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 67 1.97 1.10 
Laptop Transfer Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 70 3.27 1.25 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 27 2.70 1.27 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 74 2.84 1.43 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 66 2.56 1.30 
 
Anger/Hostility 
  
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
File Saving Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 67 5.67 5.47 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 26 6.31 5.27 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 70 6.06 5.19 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 62 7.52 5.74 
Laptop Sharing Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 69 6.30 5.56 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 26 7.58 5.79 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 74 6.96 5.65 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 63 8.71 5.92 
Laptop Transfer Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 67 4.27 4.79 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 25 4.52 4.40 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 73 5.34 5.63 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 62 5.97 5.25 
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Tension/Anxiety 
  
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
File Saving Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 68 4.68 5.34 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 26 5.08 5.80 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 71 4.77 4.65 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 60 5.57 4.80 
Laptop Sharing Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 68 5.53 5.24 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 26 6.31 5.24 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 73 6.37 5.17 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 63 7.35 5.30 
Laptop Transfer Bundle of Rights/Forewarning 67 4.07 4.65 
Bundle of Rights/No Forewarning 26 4.19 4.82 
Discrete Asset/Forewarning 74 4.26 4.58 
Discrete Asset/No Forewarning 63 4.86 4.78 
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